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THE ROLE of the agricultural sector in the economic growth of Peru is
complex. The Peruvian government has pursued a protectionist policy
with respect to domestic industrial production, but has preferred to rely
on international suppliers in the case of wheat, beef, and dairy products.
It is the national policy to provide the urban consumer with a low-cost
food basket. In those instances in which domestic supply cannot meet
domestic demand at prevailing market prices, the central government
has followed a general policy of duty free imports.
Total public expenditure in agriculture through the budget of the
central government averaged 930 million soles for 1964 and 1965.'
Fiscal revenues from agricultural export taxes and import duties on
agricultural inputs and capital goods averaged 725 million soles for
NOTE: The author served as a member of the Iowa Mission to Peru. He acted
as advisor to the Agricultural Sector Planning Office (OSPA) of the Ministry of
Agriculture and as technical director of a study on long-term demand and supply
projections of major crop and livestock products sponsored by the Agricultural
University of LaMolina, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
theAgreementonTechnicalCooperationinStatisticsandCartography
(CONESTCAR) and the National Planning Institute (INP). The author would
like to acknowledge his indebtedness to his many Peruvian associates, in particu-
lar Carlos Amat y Leon, Rafael Otero M., and Jose Salaverry Li. of the Agri-
cultural University at LaMolina, Walter Petrovitch H. of the INP, Mario Cuneo
M., Dr. A. Angulo A. OSPA and Roberto Valverde P. of the Agricultural De-
velopment Bank.
1Republicof Peru: Ministerlo de Hacienda, El Presupuesto Funcional de la
Repáblica, Lima, Peru, 1964 and 1965.p
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these years.2 The above figures, in conjunction with figures for earlier
years, show that producers of export crops have contributed the major ii
share of the financial resources that the public sector allocated for
agricultural development. Such funds were used principally in the pro-
motion of food crop production. v
The imposition of duties on food imports could generate sufficient a
revenue to double the financial resources currently allocated to agri-
culture. Our study shows (see Table 11) that if such funds were used
exclusively in the promotion of domestic production of cereals, tubers,
beans, and pulses, the productivity index of these food groups could
increase by about 4 per cent per year. The funds currently projected
available for the promotion of these food groups are so small that they
fall short of inducing a 1 per cent increase in over-all productivity.
The Peruvian government has done little to encourage the expansion
of export crops; in fact the principal export crops (cotton, sugar, and
coffee) are subject to taxation, while food crops are not. Export crops
generated 35percent of the gross value of agricultural production in s:
Prior to 1960 the value of production of export crops expanded
at a rate of 8.3 per cent per year, but in the early 1960's this rate
slowed down to 2.9 per cent because of increasing competition in slowly
expanding international markets and worsening cost-price relationships S
at home.4 The relative stagnation in the agricultural sector in the last few Ii
years stemmed principally from the slow rate of growth of the agricul-
tural export sector. The above loss of potential export earnings was not
LI
critical,because of the rapid expansion of export earnings in minerals
and fishmeal products.
I!
The Ministry of Agriculture has traditionally favored a policy of c
expandingacreage in food crops at the expense of acreage in export
crops. About 65 per cent of the land in food crops is grown by operators
who farm less than 5 hectares.5 Consequently the public sector in agri-
culture has chosen to work with small producers, an effort that in recent
years has been intensified through the agrarian reform program. Com- 9
mercialproducers have been reluctant to shift toward food crops for a
2 Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto Nacional de Planificación [INP] Direccidn
del Sector Pdblico, Recaudación de Impuestos y Otros Recursos, Lima, Peru, 1967.
(private communication)
Converiio de Cooperacion Técnica EstadIstica y Cartografla[CO5.JESTCAR],
EstadIstica.4graria Perd 1964,Lima, Peru, 1965, pp. 34—36.
4 Republic of Peru:Ministerio de Agricultura, Oficina Sectorial de Planifi-
cación Agropecuaria [ospAl Agropecuaria, Lima, Peru, 1966, P. 35. 01
CONESTCAR:Muestreo Agropecuario Nacional 1964, Lima, Peru, 1967. (private
communication)The Peruvian Experience 389
er immediate human consumption or for animal use because of the very
or limited domestic markets for these commodities. Production of feed
or grain for use in the livestock industry is of very limited importance in
Peru, partly because domestic livestock production is not competitive
with imports and partly because the periodicity in internal-cost inflation
nt and devaluation makes it difficult to obtain long-run commitments from
commercial producers to specialize in food grains or livestock produc-
ed tion.
Existing price controls and enabling legislation are spread among
national and municipal authorities and are designed almost exclusively
ed to favor the urban consumer, thereby eliminating the price incentive to
the domestic producer and defeating the public expenditure on agri-
cultural research and extension.° Although the government has repeatedly
expressed its concern about the slow rate of growth in domestic food
ad production, the financial resources made available to the agricultural
PS sector through the budget of the central government have remained a
in small and constant proportion of the total budget.
ed In more general terms, the Peruvian government in its effort to trans-
ite form the nation into a modern industrial society is faced with the fact
that its objectives for the agricultural sector conflict with those for other
sectors. Cheap food increases the real income of urban wage earners and
helps to expand fishmeal and mining exports. On the other hand, the
- markedrural poverty of the central and southern Sierra could gravitate
tot into an explosive social disequilibrium unless many landless peasants
are given a subsistence base. A stable exchange rate, in the face of
internal cost inflation, provides a low-cost food basket for the urban
of consumer but may well dampen the expansion of export crops that
could be used to finance capital imports for industrial development.
,rs Most important of all, the expansion of social services, transport, and
energy development severely strains available public budgetary resources.
-nt It is difficult to say at which stage of economic development the
urban sector can afford a transfer of income to the rural sector. It is
• or a decision that cannot be made in terms of economic efficiency only,
but must rest on considerations of equity as well. Agricultural planners
on in Peru typically think that the latter should outweigh the former, but
they do not have the power to reduce income and land distribution
aJ, inequities more than marginally.
jfi 6GeoffreyShepherd and Dale B. Furnish, The Economic and Legal Aspects
0/ Price Controls in Peruvian Agriculture, Iowa Universities Mission to Peru
ste in cooperation with the Agency for International Development, Lima, Peru,
1967, pp. 25 if.
I
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Because of a lack of technical expertise, the planning concept was
limited to drastic changes in institutional structure or output targets.
Neither had much relation to available public resources or other con-
siderations such as political, technical, and historical feasibility. The
first draft of the 1967—70 agricultural development plan did not go
beyond a statement of general objectives justified in terms of observa-
tions on existing deficiencies in production, consumption, marketing,
credit, etc., with little quantification of these deficiencies or attempt to
establish their interconnection.7 In constructing a planning methodology
the learning process proved to be frustrating and very time consuming.
The constant need to produce a preliminary planning document pre-
cluded the possibility of a systematic or comprehensive approach or of
executing a broader economic analysis of the projected performance of
the agricultural sector than contemplated by the planners.
In Peru the bulk of public expenditure in agriculture does not go
directly into the creation of products, but into either the acquisition of
knowledge or the redistribution of land. It is funnelled through some
twenty agencies, each with its own special objectives and all competing
for scarce financial and technical resources.8 Most agencies have several
regional offices, creating thereby an administrative structure that in
theory is well adapted to handle the diversified needs of the agricultural
producer in various parts of the country. In practice it has been very
difficult to assess the product-creating effect of the various agencies,
even in those few cases where the agency is directly concerned with the
expansion of land resources or the improvement in the productivity of
existing land. It is clear therefore that the product-investment nexus
is not easily ascertainable in Peru.
Since most planning models are based on an implicit causality
between investment and production and the control choices that' can be
derived therefrom, they may not be readily applicable to the case of
Peru. I suspect that the Peruvian situation is rather typical of both
developed and underdeveloped countries. In the latter the importance
of public expenditure in agriculture can easily be overrated in relation
to the impact of legislative, fiscal, monetary and price policies. In fact,
an examination of the factors contributing to agricultural growth in
Peru in the period 1950—64 would, on balance, give little reason to
impute positive importance to either public expenditure or the set of
Ministry of Agriculture, OSPA, Peru's Agriculture: Summary of Diagnosis,
Objectives, Strategy and Policy, Lima, Peru, 1966.
8 Oficina Nacional de Reforma de la Administración Püblica, Diagnosilco y
Reformas por Sectores, Sector AgrIcola, Lima, Peru, 1967, p. 355.The Peruvian Experience 391
measurestaken by the public sector relative to agriculture. The impact
of planned public expenditure in agriculture is likely to remain relatively
• modest compared to autonomous increases in production or to those
induced through expanding internal and external markets.
Agricultural planners in Peru are typically somewhat impatient with
the role of free markets in achieving a satisfactory rate of growth in
agricultural production. A more activist approach is preferred, putting
:0 great emphasis on public investment in agriculture. To the extent that
such investment can be redirected at will,itis expected to play an
important role in redressing regional imbalances in agricultural progress.
Economic growth in other sectors has been largely restricted to the urban
and coastal zone. The government has relied heavily on public expendi-
ture in agriculture as the main instrument in achieving a more equitable
• pattern of development. Consequently both agrarian reform and promo-
• tion of agriculture were forcibly redirected to zones with the lowest
economic potential.
In most underdeveloped countries the bulk of the increase in produc-
tion is achieved through expansion of the land base rather than through
al yield increases. Peru is no exception. The Ministry of Agriculture, as
in well as the semiindependent public sector in agriculture, is staffed almost
aJ exclusively by technicians who received their academic training in the
life sciences. This explains the widely held professional opinion that
increased production is most readily achieved through increased yields.
Agricultural planners are of the same background and have not fully
of adjusted to the need to consider a broader range of planning variables
is such as irrigation, colonization, and price policies.
The idea of planning implies that the planner may reasonably con- t
sider a number of alternatives. To the extent that agricultural planning
focuses on the role of public expenditure in agriculture such planning
of is concerned with maintaining a reasonable degree of flexibility with
respect to the total amount of expenditure made available for agri-
cultural development from the budget of the central government or
)fl external sources. But, in fact, agriculture's share of the national budget
• throughout the period 195 1—65 has been small and virtually constant.9
in It is true that public expenditure has grown more rapidly than the gross
to domestic income but, for public investment in agriculture to have a
of 9 Bank for Reconstruction and Development, TheAgricultural
Developmentof Peru, Part 2, Detailed Report (report of a mission organized
•is, by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the gov-
•Y ernment of Peru), Washington, D.C., 1959, p. 35; and Presupuesto Funciona! de
le Repdblica, Lima, Peru, 1958—65.392 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
measurable impact upon agricultural growth,it must show a much
sharper acceleration. The most important annual budget decisions are
those that create new activities within the budget. It is essentially this
component that gives some flexibility between years. Since such activities
usually refer to new institutional activities (e.g., the creation of CONAP,
CONESTCAR, ONRA, OSPA),bo they are not variables that readily
enter into a quantitative model of economic growth. Most growth models
are relatively strong on behavioral relationships between major macro-
economic variables, but are relatively lacking in those variables that i
enter into public revenue and expenditure accounts, the structure of
internal and external public debt, and the balance of payments. If a
growth model is to be used for planning purposes, ideally it should pro-
vide suggested courses of action for the principal instrumental variables
entering into the public accounts. In a second stage, the aggregated public
accounts must be decomposed on a sectoral basis and subsequently on
an agency basis. Presumably, there is an infinite number of ways to r
decompose a given total between the various public accounts. In practice
the momentum of existing programs will, in the main, dictate the method
of sectoral decomposition of planned total public expenditure. Peruvian aS
agricultural planners have focused their attention almost exclusively on
the role of public expenditure in relation to agrarian reform and the
p1
improvementof rural income levels in the Sierra, to the detriment of
either commercial agriculture or the urban consumer.
The easy and arbitrary manner in which normative positions are ta
taken with respect to both the ends and means of agricultural planning is
in Peru is very disconcerting to a visiting foreign adviser. At the same
time, to assume that past policies are the norm for the future is equally gj
dangerous. Paradoxically therefore, it is no simple matter to ascertain the bi
objectives of agricultural planning. For example, it is not clear whether
the government aims to tax private urban consumption expenditure to
support agricultural development, or whether the agricultural sector is in
to be taxed in an indirect manner to support urban industrial develop-
ment. A reading of the National Development Planwouldsuggest the
former, but a consultation of existing legislation 12andbudget allocations
would suggest the latter. la
d
CorporaciónNacional de Abastecimientos (CONAP),Conveniode Coopera- k4.
ción Técnica EstadIsticay CartografIa(CONESTCAR),OficinaNacional de Re- A',
forma Agraria (ONRA), Oficina Sectorial de Planificación Agropecuaria (ospA).
11Ministeriode Hacienda, INP, Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social 1967— D$
1970, Lima, Peru, 1967, P. 127.
12See,El Congreso de Ia Repüblica Peruana, Ley de Creación del Ministerio lot
de AgriculturaNo. 9711,Jan.2,1943, Tit.1; El Congreso de La RepâblicaPeruvian Experience 393
b Agricultural planners, perhaps because of their background in the life
•e sciences, have been reluctant to study the financing of agricultural
development. This emphasizes the need for agricultural economists with
experiencein macroeconomic analysis. Where a national planning
; instituteexists, the above information can be adopted instead of having
to be generated first hand. On the other hand carrying out the financial
and macroeconomic analyses within the agricultural planning office
would have the advantage of strengthening the stature of planners who
in a hierarchichal sense take their directives from planners interested
in more global objectives.
a The financial resources available to the agricultural sector on current
account are allocated principally through the budget of the central gov-
ernment. For many agencies this is the only source of funding. Other
ic agencies derive considerable revenue from earmarked tax revenue. All
the larger agencies in agriculture derive a considerable part of their
revenue on capital account. External debts are important for the agencies
in charge of agricultural credit, promotion, irrigation, and colonization.
Internal debts are important principally for the agrarian reform agency
and agricultural development bank. Given the limited availability of
these resources much of the desired acceleration of the land reform
process will depend on the possibility of attracting international financ-
ing.
To date, revenue and expenditure accounts are only partially available
re to the agricultural planners. The construction of such a set of accounts
is a painstaking process complicated by the fact that expenditure and
revenue data are itemized for control purposes rather than for pro-
gramming or functional purposes. From a pragmatic point of view, the
ie budgeting and the program evaluation processes are the most important
er and time-consuming components of agricultural planning. In both these
to areas substantial improvements in methodology are needed. Both budget-
is ing and evaluation should order accounting data in such a way that a
cost and output estimate can be assigned to the various proposed activi-
ties of the agency. The establishment of programming offices within each
Peruana, Ley de Promoción y Desarrollo Agropecuarlo del Pals, Especialinente
Ia Producción de Articulos Alimentosos y Normal Abastecimiento No. 16726,
Oct. 27, 1967 (general dispositions); Dale B. Furnish, Investigaciones Legales de
las Estructuras de Co,nercialización Agropecuaria enelPeril:Trigo; and Un
Andlisis de Ins Leyes Sobre ci Ganado y Ia Came en ci Peril, Iowa Universities
• Missionto Peru in cooperation with the Agency for International Development,
7... December1967;RaulL.Munoz Cabrera, Invesligaciones Legales de las Estruc-
turas de Comerciaiizacidn Agropecuaria en ci Peril: Aceite y Grasas Comestibles,
Iowa Universities Mission to Peru in cooperation with the Agency for Interna-
-ca tional Development, Lima, Peru, 1967 (unpublished).
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agency has been only partially successful in reshaping agency accounts.
In practice the programming offices have played an important role only
in formulating the preliminary budget requests submitted to the Ministry
of Finance. The constant scarcity of funds has put the programming
offices under considerable pressure to overestimate the impact of their
proposed activities and to underestimate the cost of carrying these
activities out. Since the fiscal situation is so variable between years, few
agencies document their needed financial resources beyond next year's
budget request. Consequently, the problem of how to finance agricultural
development on a longer run basis has never been studied in detail. r
In the absence of functionally classified public expenditure data, no
substantive generalization can be made about the cost of transforming
traditional agriculture. Theoretical studies of agricultural development
focus on the endogenous variables and their logical interrelationships.
Certain exogenous variables like population, the subsistence wage rate,
or technological progress have also been considered, but little or no
attention has been given to instrumental variables. Yet, the main focus
in agricultural planning should be precisely on instrumental variables
corresponding to individual decision-making units. The reasons for this 4
areas follows. First, planning necessarily takes place in a decentralized
system where decision makers at the lower levels do not necessarily c1
think in terms of the same performance concepts as decision makers
at the top levels. Second, the performance concepts maximized at the
lower levels of the hierarchy may be in direct conflict with over-all
objectives. It is of course the function of the planners to resolve such
conflicts. In a centralized planning system this would be carried on by
decree. In the Peruvian decentralized situation it would have to be done
through persuasion,a method withlittlechance of success under
present conditions. Formally, the issue can be resolved through casting ri
the planning process in mathematical form and optimizing a social wel-
f are function. However, there is not enough agreement on the role of
agricultural development in Peru to permit weighting of objectives. 19
Taking the above observations as a point of departure, we decided iL
that the preliminary agricultural development plan should limit itself to sj
determining in a systematic manner the feasible rate of growth, rather i1
thanthe optimal rate of growth or optimal allocationof public
expenditure.
To determine the feasible rate of growth in agriculture we studied the
major exogenous and endogenous variables in agricultural development.
The specificvariables considered were population,gross domestic
d4,
income,public revenue and expenditure accounts, balance of payments, njn
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exchangerate, indexes of land productivity, trends in land use, agri-
cultural labor force, intermediate inputs used in agriculture, prices paid
and received by farmers, agricultural taxation, agricultural credit, pro-
posed public land expansion and productivity programs (including their
financial requirements), and other public expenditure in agriculture. The
above variables were used to develop three alternative hypotheses con-
cerning the rate of growth in agricultural production. By estimating the
growthin demand, decomposed by region and rural and urban areas, we
al obtained targets 'that domestic development in supply had to meet if
reliance on imports were to be reduced.
An increase in domestic supply comes about through an increase in
either cultivated acreage or yield levels. In the Ricardian theory of
at economic growth an increase in cultivated acreage, barring technological
s. progress, is associated with decreasing average yield levels.'3 In our
e, study we assumed that yields were independent of the expansion in the
to land base since too little is known about the quality of Peruvian soils
•is under actual and proposed cultivation.14 Historically, cultivated acreage
es in food and export crops grew at the same rate as population, and it
ds seemed reasonable to project a continuation of that tendency in the
period 1967—70, allowing for a decrease in cultivated acreage in export
ly crops. Total cultivated acreage was decomposed simultaneously by mdi-
rs vidual crops and by groups of crops in three regions (see page 435).
he Given the projected increase in cultivated acreage we considered the
ill feasibility of the projected increases for each region. For this purpose
the land use limits as given in the preliminary land inventoryandthe
proposed public investment in irrigation and colonization were consulted.
With respect to yield increases we explored three hypotheses. Under
er the first hypothesis the general yield index would increase at its historical
rate, that is, zero per cent per year. Under the second and third hypoth-
eses the general yield index was to increase annually by one per cent and
of two per cent, respectively. The projections were carried out in two stages.
First, the general productivity hypothesis was adopted, and then the
ed indexes of yields by groups or crops or individual crops were determined
to simultaneously by regions (see pages 422—23). The projected increases
ter in yields were separated into two components, those induced by agricul-
lie tural research and extension programs, and those due to autonomous
'3H.Barkai, "Ricardo on Factor Prices and Income Distribution in a Growing
•he Economy," Econonsica(New Series), Vol.26, pp. 240—250, August 1959.
at. OficinaNacional de Evaluación de Recursos Maturates [ONERN], Capacidad
tic de Uso de los Sue!os del Perd, Lima, Peru, 1965.
I.C. Paez, et a!., Diagnostico Agrario, Ministerio de Agricultura, Servicid de
ts, Investigación y Promoción Agraria [sIPA], Lima, Peru, 1964 (mimeo.).
II,
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developments not related to activities in the public sector. The latter it
are captured in the main by a projection of trends in past yields. We also n
took account of the fact that induced productivity increases modify the
past trends in yields. The projected yield levels for 1970, according to ii
the three hypotheses, were compared with the impact that planned ml
productivity programs 16areexpected to have in 1970. From this corn-
parison it developed that the proposed programs, if fully funded, would e:
be barely sufficient to accelerate the general yield index by one per cent th
per year (see Table 11). th
Given the respective hypotheses relative to expansion in acreage and
asimple matter to compute the projected ex-
pansion in production. Using enterprise budgets from the Agricultural su
Development Bankandthe Agricultural Promotion and Research in
Service 18wecomputed the necessary labor requirements and interme-
diate inputs corresponding to the various production hypotheses. A pre-
cel
vious detailed analysis on population growth by regions and by rural
and urban areas yielded a provisional estimate of the growth in the agri- Pc
cultural labor force by regions. The projected growth in the available
labor force was closely balanced with the projected labor requirements sir
according to the production hypotheses.'9 Because of the limited accel-
eration in productivity and the typically low values for the input elastici-
ties, commercial inputs like fertilizer and pesticides were projected to ce
grow at approximately twice the rate of growth in production. Domestic, in
installed, manufacturing capacity can adequately cope with the pro-
jected expansion in commercial inputs. Subsequent sections deal in de- uq






During the period 1950—64 the Peruvian economy grew at a rate sub-
stantially higher than the average for Latin America. The gross domestic
16See,Ministerio de Agricultura, 5IPA, Proyecios de Incremento de ía Pro- uii
ducción1967—1970: de Papa; de Cereales-Avena-Quinua-Trigo-Cebada;deArroz;
deMaIz;de Menestras, Lima, Peru, 1967.
'7HarryHiggins and Roberto V. Piedra, ZonificaciónySectorizaciónTern-
torial—CostosBdsicos de ProducciOn AgrIcola 1965, Oficina de Planificación, P9
Banco de Fomento Agropecuario del Perd, Lima, 1966 (mimeo.).
18Paez,op. cit.
Itwas assumed that yield-increasing techniques would not be labor in- 19$
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income doubled between 1950 and 1964.20 The principal factor per-
mining such rapid growth was the rapid expansion of fishmeal and
mineral exports. The dollar value of exports tripled between 1950 and F"
1964. Since 1950 public investment and expenditure has absorbed an
increasing share of the gross domestic product (GDP), reaching 16.5
per cent of final demand in 1964. At the same time, the stability of the
Ed exchange rate in the presence of a moderate but continuous decline in
the domestic purchasing power of the Peruvian sol periodically eroded
the profitability of agricultural and industrial exports. This erosion was
an important factor in the most recent devaluation (September 1967).
The growth in GDP between 1950 and 1964 was accompanied by
al substantial changes in its sectoral composition. During this period the
industrial sector increased its relative share from 15.6 per cent to 19.3
e- per cent, while that of the agricultural sector diminished from 25 per
e- cent to 17.4 per cent.2' The agricultural sector and the population grew
al virtually at the same rate; all other sectors grew at least twice as fast.
Per capita income increases, except for the agriculturally employed seg-
le ment of the population, were well above the minimum designated de-
.ts sirable at the Punta del Este meetings of 1961. The contrast between a
viable economic future in urban-based occupations and the relative stag-
nation of per capita earnings in agricultural employment led to an ac-
to celerated migration of rural dwellers to the cities. But the growth of
c, industrial activity with its related service complex was largely restricted
to the Lima metropolitan area. Economic growth in Peru, therefore, was
e- unbalanced among sectors and among regions. Population movements
between census years reflect this increased dualism of the Peruvian
economy. We project that for the period 1960—70 the rate of growth of
the urban population in the coastal area will be at least 4.8 per cent
per year, while the annual rate of growth of the rural population in the
Sierra is not likely to exceed 0.9 per cent for the same period. The
mobility of Peru's most ample resource, unskilled young labor, will con-
tinue to be a major factor in transforming the traditional economy.
- Officialplanning documents, however, reflect the belief that economic
IC growth should be shared more equitably among regions and between
urban and rural population groups. Therefore, public investment and
expenditure plans call for a juxtaposition of the expected resource alloca-
ri- tionon the basis of a complementary relationship between growth in
private and public activities. Under this principle the "Plan de Desarrollo
20 Ministerio de Hacienda, INP, La Evolución de Ia Economia en el Perlodo
1950—1964, Vol. I, Lima, Peru, 1966.
22 ibid., Vol. 3.
I
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Económico y Social 1967—1970" 22gavefirst priority to public invest-
ment projects related to agricultural activities in the central and southern 11
Sierra. a
The Peruvian industrial sector (excluding mining and fIshmeal)is a
primarily oriented towards internal final demands. To meet these de- II
mands it relies heavily on imports of intermediate goods, capital goods, n
and raw materials. A rapid and sustained rate of growth in this sector is a:
possible only with an equally dynamic export sector. Although the Ci
Peruvian export sector is diversified, it is nevertheless restricted to raw h
materials, such as fishmeal, cotton, sugar, and mineral exports. Reduc- P
tion in export earnings has caused a reduction in industrial growth. To rt
the extent that public revenue relies heavily on import duties and trans- m
action and profit taxes, it tends to be reduced with decreases in indus- ci
• trialactivity. Pursuit of a countercyclical or expansionary economic
policy during recessions would lead to a sizeable budget deficit that
would have to be financed externally or through domestic inflation. The
Peruvian government prior to 1963 followed the conservative alternative th
of trying to adjust expenditures to revenues. th
In more recent years the government has pursued an expansionist
policy in the public sector. Expansion was most rapid in health, educa-
*
tion,communication, and transportation. Savings on current account
decreased rapidly. Prior to 1962 a large share of capital expenditure hi
was financed by means of savings on current account. Subsequently, CC
savingson current account decreased rapidly as the growth in public
revenue failed to keep pace with the growing pressure of current ex- grc
penditures. This brought about an increased dependence on foreign
public capital, which means of course a growth in the public external
debt with increased future interest and amortization payments. Recent
projections by the National Planning Institute indicate that, in the event
ofa decline in copper prices, amortization and interest payments will wq
exceed the traditional upper limit of 15 per cent of export earnings. wd
If high levels of public investment are to be maintained, the govern-
ment will have to slow down the growth of current expenditure and we
generate additional tax revenue in order to meet the financial needs of
the growing capital accounts. Tax revenue increases were less than pro-
portional to public expenditure and investment. To meet the growing
financial demands of public expenditure and investmentit has been
fiscally expedient to increase indirect taxes notably import duties. With
the growing amortization and interest payments on the foreign public
debt, the need for internal financing of public investment will increase
and the case for tax reform will strengthen.
22Plande Desarrollo Econdmicoy Social 1967—1970. SitI
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• 4
Theprincipal variables of the public accounts also enter into the
national income accounts and balance of payments accounts; for ex-
ample, the national income, balance of payments, and the public sector
accounts are interdependent systems of economic variables. Because of
the interdependence of the major macroeconomic accounts a macroeco-
-
nomicmodel must be designed to provide the required consistency
among the accounts and must be supplemented by projections of the
complete balance of payments and public sector accounts. A compre-
hensive forecast of the performance of the economy must be made to
- provideagricultural planners with an estimate of the probable financial
resources available (historically the proportion of financial resources
- madeavailable to public agencies in the agricultural sector through the
- centralbudget has averaged below 3 per cent), the expected rate of
V. growthin per capita income, and a good indication of whether or not
devaluation of the domestic currency should be taken into account.
The Peruvian national development plan is based upon projections of
the major macroeconomic variables and the principal components of
I thepublic expenditure and investment accounts. The plan lists as general
objectives the attainment of increased production and productivity, a
more equitable income distribution, increased employment, and reduced
dependence on external financial assistance and export markets. Simple
e historical projections revealed that the above objectives were mutually in-
compatible unless a strongly accelerated capital formation could be
financed out of savings on current account. Taxes as a proportion of
gross domestic income woul4 have to increase sharply, mostly at the
price of reduced growth in urban consumption expenditure. Imports of
durable consumer goods would have to be decreased very substantially
as would imports of intermediate inputs and raw materials after domestic
industries were established. The establishment of domestic industries
ii would entail a very sharp initial rise in capital goods imports, but these
would level off after a five-year period. Under the plan the agricultural
sector would receive priority, first, because its rate of growth lagged
d well behind the other sectors, and second, because expansion of agri-
cultural production was considered the principal means by which rural
income levels could be raised. The plan does not detail the economic and
g legal studies or the investment projects that support the feasibility of the
n broad strategies sketched in the above paragraphs. It is consistent, how-
h ever, in that, within an integrated system of national income and public-
C sectoraccounts, certain variables can be predetermined if a correspond-
e ing number of variables can be adjusted accordingly.
In the light of past experience the supposed flexibilities in the compo-
sition of imports, capital formation, and public revenue are doubtful.Transforming Traditional Agriculture
The National Planning Institute did not execute or sponsor studies that in,
might have shown how the required flexibility could be brought about. sy
The plan, therefore, presents little more than a normative projection of
important macroeconomic and fiscal variables.
Within the Peruvian planning system the agricultural planning office
(OSPA) takes its broad directives from the National Planning Institute
(INP), but serves simultaneously as an advisory arm to the Ministry
of Agriculture. In the latter capacity OSPA had to decide whether the
projected income growth and public investment program of INP were
sufficiently realistic. The rapid rate of growth in per capital income fore-
cast by INP would, particularly when skewed towards the rural popu-
lation, accelerate the demand for domestic and imported foods con-
siderably. This in turn would justify a considerable public investment
in agriculture, particularly in those regions where the population was
predominantly rural. On the other hand, if income growth was relatively
low and restricted to the urban areas, as it historically has been, and if
the government were forced into an austerity program and devaluation,
then both the expansion of demand and the priorities of public expendi-
ture in agriculture would be drastically altered.
Agricultural planning cannot reach an acceptable level of reliability
without considerable preliminary research. In Peru few of the necessary
basic economic studies have been made, or at least are available. Few
opportunities exist to carry out basic research within a planning office,
where data must be available at short notice.
The work of the USDA/CONESTCAR contract team was designed
to fill, in a modest way, the above gap. This group carried out compre- naU
hensive studies producing population, income, price, demand, yield,
acreage, and import-export projections as well as Engel curves and
re
gathering data for price elasticities. The agricultural planning office pro-
duced corresponding studies on required labor and nonlabor inputs, the
ID
required public credit, the required public investment and expenditure
that corresponded to three comprehensive groups of supply projections,
and the projected availability of public finances for the agricultural
sector.
To make projections of the major macroeconomic variables, one of
the Thorbecke-Condos macroeconomic models was used.23 The variables
ErikThorbecke and Apostolos Condos,Macroeconomic Growth and De- . -t
velopmentModels of thePeruvian Economy," inIrma Adelman and Erik m
Thorbecke (ed.), The Theory and Design of Economic Development, Baltimore,
1966. The authors present three alternative models; the one employed inthe
present study is identified as "Model A." The model was reestimated using 1963
constant price time series. NetI ThePeruvian Experience 401
it included in the model are presented below with their corresponding
t. symbols:







•it P =privategross investment
1Y P =publicgross investment
if
M =totalimports of goods and services




-e, T' =indirecttax revenues
It should be noted that GDI is being used instead of GNP or gross
national income.24 This is justified by the importance of the terms-of-
trade effects in the past evolution of the Peruvian economy and by the
relatively small magnitude of net transfers.
I
Thesymbol Z refers to the terms-of-trade effects, defined as the
product of the terms-of-trade index and the value of exports at 1963
prices, taking the existing terms-of-trade index in 1963 as a basis and
-re measuring deviations either positive or negative from the 1963 level.
•IS, Symbolically:
•a] \
Z = ÷ — 1)Qx1, Px0
\PX0 P/fl0/
es where Px,, and Px0 refer to the unit value of exports in year n and in the
base year respectively; and Pm0 refer to the unit value of imports
rik in year n and in the base year respectively. refers to the volume of
re, exports in year n.
he
-53 The relationships defining each of these concepts are: GDI =GNP+ Z +
Net transfers and GNI =GDI+ Net transfers.
.1• T
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The model describes the structure of the economy by means of nine o
equations (for nine enciogenous variables) of which four are identity a
equations defining X,I andrespectively, and the remaining five p
are behavioral equations.is regressed on disposable GDI, C° on total ci
tax revenues, and total tax revenues on GDI. The private investment al
function depends on exports (E_1) and the terms-of-trade effects v
(Z_1) both lagged one year. Thus, private investment is determined 0:
completely exogenously by the export sector. As the builders of the
model point out, "This appears to be a reasonable hypothesis in the case
of Peru, given (a) the relative importance of the export sector; (b) the si
very highly capital-intensive nature of the export sector; and (c) the te
virtual absence of a domestic capital goods producing sector." 25Finally, la
• imports are regressed on total consumption and total gross investment, of







(7) P =+ + ii'Z_i
(8) M =mo+ m0(C1' + + m21
(9)
dij
Equations 1—4 are identities, and 5—9 are the postulated behavioral equa- P11
tions. The variables determined within the system of equations (endog-
enous variables) are X, I, P, M and T. The predeter-
mined or exogenous variables are E, Z, and to, where the last
three may be catalogued as potential policy instruments in the hands of
the government.
The basic data used in the estimation of the model were taken from th
the INP national income accounts. Values are given in millions of soles
at constant 1963 prices. The five behavioral equations were estimated
• on the basis of a sample consisting of yearly observations for the period
1950—65. Once estimated, the nine equations were solved for the en-
dogenous variables in terms of the exogenous variables. The results are
presented in Table 1. The reduced form shows explicitly how the value
Pe
25Thorbeckeand Condos, op. cit., p. 190. Eel.11 ThePeruvian Experience 403
of each endogenous variable is affected by each of the exogenous van-
ty ables. Each coefficient appearing in the reduced form should be inter-
we preted as the amount by which the respective endogenous variable will
al change with a one-unit variation in the corresponding exogenous van-
• able. The high responsiveness of X to changes in the export sector
•ts variables is reflected in the relative magnitudes of the multiplier effect
of a unit change in E and Z and that ofThis shows an important
he linkage between export growth and income growth.
se The model appears to describe the evolution of GDI relatively well,
he since it signals all turning points correctly. It does show, however, a
•
-' he tendency to overreact to changes in the export sector. This is particu-
larly clear for the recession of 1957—58 and the subsequent export boom
-it: of 1959—61. These overreactions are largely explained by the model
formulation in which investment is solely dependent upon current and
lagged exports earnings. Substantial private mining investments occurred
precisely in the years in which the model overreacts. For example, in
1953—54 the Marcona mining complex was brought into production,
followed by the Toquepala copper mines in 1957—58. The relatively
poor prediction of GDI in 1965 and 1966 can be explained for the
most part by the very large public foreign capital inflows for those years.
Similar developments must be allowed for when the model is used in
projecting the major macroeconomic variables. Projections of the en-
• dogenous variables are linear combinations of the projections of the
exogenous variables, in our case exports, the terms of trade, public
investment, and direct tax revenue. It might have been possible to use
the projections of the National Development Plan for this purpose. We
did not do so because we felt the INP projection to be too optimistic.
The Peruvian export sector is quite diversified. In 1965 nine primary
Ia- products accounted for 95 per cent of the total value of exports. (Agri-
cultural exports constituted 23 per cent of all exports in 1965.) With the
en- recent devaluation, cotton exports can be expected to increase moder-
ast ately because of the drastic increase in the price-cost relationship for
•of that crop. In the case of sugar and coffee, world production will con-
tinue to exceed world consumption for some years to come. Apart from
this, there is the fact that Peru's foreign markets for these two products
les are in economically developed countries with low income elasticities and
ted low population growth. Such markets offer little prospect of rapid expan-
tod sion. A more detailed treatment of individual products may be found
en- elsewhere.26
•are
26 René Vandendries, El Comercio Exterior yelDesarrollo Económico del
Perá, Iowa Universities Mission to Peru in cooperation with the Agency for In-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2The Peruvian Experience 405
We project that from 1966 to 1971 exports will accelerate annually
from 3.5 per cent in 1967 to 4.5 per cent in 1971. A cumulative rate of
8.2 per cent is projected for 1972 and after, when, as anticipated., the
Cerro Verde, Cuajones, and Michiquillay mines become productive.
The terms-of-trade effect was estimated by projecting export and im-
port prices. Export prices characteristically have shown large fluctua-
tions without a definite trend, but import prices have grown steadily.
Export prices increased after the recession of the developed economies
in the late 1950's and increased to a very high level in 1966 chiefly
because of copper prices. We think this trend will level off. Import
prices have risen at an average rate of 1.4 per cent per year, and we
assumed that they will continued to grow at that stable rate.
Table 2 presents the projected values of the endogenous variables.
The annual rate of growth in disposable income is projected at 3.4 per
cent between 1966 and 1970, thereafter to accelerate rather sharply.
The variables included in the model are not sufficient to project the
public sector accounts. On the revenue side they omit nontax revenue
and the capital account. On the expenditure side they omit current and
capital transfers and the amortization and interest payments on the
public debt.
Revenues on capital account were projected separately.27 Nontax
revenue was estimated through a linear regression for the period 1950—
64. The total revenue projected for 1970 equals 31.7 billion soles
(Table 3). Total public expenditure, by definition, equals total revenue.
From past performance agriculture can be assumed to be a relatively
constant proportion of total public expenditure. On this basis public
expenditure in agriculture can easily be predicted within a relatively
narrow range. We considered three possible percentages. A pessimistic
projection would allocate 2.8 per cent of public expenditure to agricul-
ture. At the other extreme, we did not expect this allocation to exceed
3.3 per cent. The intermediate figure, 3 per cent, was thought to be the
most probable. Under these hypotheses total public resources available
to the agricultural sector in 1970 would range from a low of 889 million
soles to a high of 1,047 million soles (see Table 4). The percentage
composition of public expenditure within agriculture in 1970 was set
equal to the percentage composition of 1966. This yielded a first ap-
proximation of projected financial resources available by activities in
1970.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0T 408 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
TABLE 4
Public Financial Resources Projected for the Agricultural Sector





Agrarian reform and colonization 173.4 185.8 204.3
Agricultural research, extension
and development 129.2 138.4 152.3
Irrigation 146.5 156.9 172.6
National fertilizer corporation 132.1 191.5 155.6
Agricultural development bank 207.1 221.9 244.0
Other 100.3 107.5 118.3
Total public resources in





































aBasedon projected public expenditure in 1970 of 31,738.5 million
soles (at 1963 prices).
POPULATION GROWTH
Peru can be divided into three natural regions—the Coast, the Sierra,
and the Selva. The composition and growth of population have been
very different among these regions. The Sierra and Selva are pre-
dominantly rural, whereas the Coast is predominantly urban. The rapid
growth of population in the first two regions has been fed by a sizeable
emigration from the Sierra. Employment opportunities and per capita
earnings are very different between these regions, in both the agricultural
and nonagricultural sectors. Labor productivity in industrial and related
activitiesis increasing substantially faster than in agriculture. Con-
sequently, the differences in per capita income between the urban and
rural population will increase rather than diminish. Such differences,
although undesirable, are virtually permanent in a structural sense.
The stated objective of the agricultural development plan isto
increase rural incomes in the Sierra through increasing yields of basic
food crops. However, financial resources projected available fall short
I
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of permitting more than a one per cent increase in yields of basic food
crops. From the foregoing it follows that the increase in per capita rural
incomes cannot exceed a moderate annual percentage, unless the current
rate of rural-urban migration is at least maintained. A detailed com-
putation of agricultural labor requirements by regions (for projected
developments in crop and livestock production) revealed that the current
ire rate of growth in rural population is almost exactly balanced by the
projected rate of growth in labor requirements. The projected rate of
growth in labor supply is net of migration. Using cross-sectional data we
3 found a fairly close relationship between the level of agricultural pro-
ductivity and the daily wage rate.
2 3 Any retention of agricultural labor supply, not related to labor require-
•76 ments, will therefore lower the labor productivity and earnings of the
56 agricultural worker. Almost inevitably the gap between the per capita
incomes of the urban and rural population will increase. Peruvian plan-
3.3 ners do not want the public sector to play an entirely passive role in
• this process. The agrarian reform program is directly aimed at solving
i the problem of rural poverty. Until now, this process has been slow
— becausethe government, by law, cannot appropriate without adequate
compensation. Projected available funds for land reform do not permit
•DI' an acceleration of this fundamental program.
Population projections were carried out in two stages. Official pro-
jections were available for urban and rural population,28 but not for
population growth by natural regions. With respect to national popula-
tion, demographers feel that the decline in mortality rates has entered
Ta, a stage of deceleration. Nevertheless the average mortality rate for 1980
is projected at less than half the current rate of 14.2 per thousand.
ire- During the period 1940—61 the average rate of female reproduction
pid was 3.2. There is no agreement among demographers on the future
ble course of this critical determinant of population growth. The officially
-)ita adopted population projection anticipates a decrease in the birth rate
iral from 4.41 to 3.81 in the late seventies. Growth of total population is
•ted projected at 3.1 per cent annually during the next decade. This is cer-
tainly the lowest estimate admissible.
md Because of the insufficiency of vitalstatisticsin Peruit proved
impossible to establish conclusive differences between urban and rural
mortality rates. From 1961 census data, it was determined that rural
•to
28 See, Ministerlo de Hacienda, INP, Dirección Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos,
mSiC Boletines de Análisis Demografico: No. 1—Poblaciôn del Perd and No. 3—
tOrt Población Urbana y Rural del Perd, Lima, Peru, 1964—65.410 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
fertility rates were considerably higher than urban fertility rates. There-
fore, the projected decrease in the average national rate of fertility could
only be sustained by projecting a balanced decrease between urban and
rural fertility rates, although there are no a priori reasons supporting
a decrease in rural fertility rates. The rates of rural-urban migration
were estimated through an intercensal comparison. They show an
acceleration between the two census years. To avoid the risk of obtaining
too rapid a rate of urbanization, current rates of migration were assumed
to remain constant for the next twenty years. The resulting projected
annual rate of growth in rural population equalled 1.1 per cent as
compared to 4.27 per cent for the urban population. Comparatively
minor increases in migration rates would reduce the rate of rural popu-
lation growth to zero.
The composition of the population by three natural regions was
obtained on the basis of the census of 1940 and of 1961. Changes in
composition among regions between the two census years were assumed
to be linear and yielded the projected composition in 1970. Total pro-
jected population could then be distributed among regions. Changes in
composition between urban and rural population for a given region were
assumed to be linear between 1940 and 1961. Using the projected
composition for 1970, we distributed the projected total for each region
according to rural or urban areas (see Table 5). These projections
indicated a very rapid urbanization of the coastal region. A later, inde-
pendent estimate for the Lima metropolitan area reinforced this observa-
tion. Initially, however, we lowered the rate of urbanization on the
Coast because of an anticipated shortage in the agricultural labor force.
Consequently, the projected rate of growth in rural population tends to
be biased upwards, and is larger than the official projection.
TABLE 5
Projected Population Growth for Urban and Rural Areas
by Regions, 1960—70
(annual geometric rates)
Coast Sierra Selva Republic
Urban 4.8 2.5 5.8 4.1
Rural 2.9 1.0 3.9 1.8
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Id DEMAND PROJECTIONS
rig The dualistic pattern of economic growth in Peru has created a striking
• heterogeneity among regions and population groups in respect to the
an principal factors that determine demand. A demand forecast based on
rig average national parameters would introduce a systematic error. Thus,
ed for example, domestic demand for traditionally imported food products
ed projected from disaggregated data is larger than if aggregate data are
as used. This error was avoided by disaggregating the forecast.
In the more-developed countries regional differences in per capita
income are relatively small. Both the rural and urban population have
equal access to a wide variety of food products. This tends to create a
'as homogeneous consumption pattern throughout the country. In Peru,
in however, the rural population consumes a substantial proportion of
•ed what it produces. Generally a few staple crops constitute the bulk of
the rural diet, e.g., rice on the Coast, tubers in the Sierra and bananas
in in the Selva.
Largely on the basis of secondary information 29weobtained twenty-
• five typical household consumption profiles distributed by regions and
population groups. We found that the differences in per capita consump-
-le- tion between the urban and rural population were large for food groups
except for cereals (see Table 6). A,segional comparison of per capita
he consumption of food groups yielded differences of a similar order. The
heterogeneity with respect to individual foods was even more striking.
• However, urban consumption patterns tend to be fairly homogeneous
among regions.
The average blue-collar and white-collar family in Peru spend close
• to 55percent of family income on food. We estimated that the urban
expenditure-income elasticity forall food equalled 0,8,arelatively
high figure when compared with results obtained in other countries.
The multiplicity of qualities and forms in which food is marketed con-
29See,Carlos Collazos Chiriboga, et al., The Food and Nutrition Situation in
Peru, RepOblica del Per(i, Ministerio de Salud PCiblica y Asistencia Social, and
IC InteramericanCooperative Service of Public Health, Lima, 1960; Ministerio de
— Hacienda—PlanRegional para el DesarrollodelSur del Peru,Parronesde Con-
sumo en las Ciudades de Arequipa y Cuzco, Vol. XV, Lima, Peru, 1959—INP,
Dirección Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos, Encuesta Sobre las Condiciones de
Vida de Ia Familia en: Lirna-Callao, Arequipa, !-fuoncayo, Cliiclciyo e Iquitos,
Abril 1964—Marzo 1965 (resultados finales), Lima, Peru, 1966 (private com-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Peruvian Experience 413
tributesto substantial price differentiation between income groups.
Quantity-income elasticitiesare therefore substantially smaller than
expenditure-income elasticities. The primary data underlying the econo-
metric analysis of a number of household expenditure surveys were
made available by the Ministry of Health and the Dirección Nacional de
EstadIstica. A family of Engel curves was estimated for every basic
commodity for each of the twelve cities for which data were available.
Surprisingly,the double-logarithmic curve ranked above the other
possible expenditure-income relationships in terms of a weighted cr1-
tenon that included the coefficient of determination, the additivity prop-
erty of individual product relations into group expenditure curves, and
the additivity of individual product elasticities into a weighted group
average. Constant-expenditure elasticities imply that the percentage
• composition of household expenditure changes with increasing per
capita income. Nevertheless, when we made a detailed comparison for
Lima between the household expenditure data of 1934 and 1964, we
• found that the percentage composition of the blue-collar and white-
collar food budget had changed very little.30 To assume that real income
per capita had not risen for these numerically important income groups
seemed unduly pessimistic. The difference must rather be sought in com-
pensating changes itt prices for food relative to nonfood.
A more precise formulation can be obtained as follows. With a double-
logarithmic demand function the proportional rate of growth in food
consumption will be a linearly weighted function of the proportional
rates of growth in food and nonfood prices and per capita income in
current prices. The weights are the respective price and income elas-
ticities. From the above relationship the proportional rate of growth in
food expenditure is easily derived by adding the proportional rate of
growth in the price of food. Given that the expenditures on food and
nonfood have increased at equal rates the following relationship must
hold
Pf Pnf+
where e indicates a direct price elasticity and E an income elasticity.
The subscript /refersto food and the subscript nf to nonfood prod-
ucts. The lower-case letters p and y indicate the proportional rates
of growth prices and per capita income, both in current prices. For
Lima the total-expenditure elasticity on food equalled 0.79 and the
3°Thedetaileddata ofthe1934 household expenditure survey were made
available by the Dirección Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos.
pPrices . Expenditure
Elasticities Food Nonfood
Food quantities —.70 —.09 0.79
Nonfood quantities —.31 —.91 122
Budget proportions .51 .49 1.00
direct-price elasticity for all food equalled —0.7. The percentage of
the total expenditure on food for Lima is 51. Thus, given that the
weighted sum of the expenditure-income elasticities must equal unity,
it follows that the expenditure-income elasticity for nonfood equals
1.22. No direct estimate of the price elasticity of nonfood was available,
but this parameter can be deduced from the interrelationships that must
hold among the direct and cross-price elasticities within a complete
system of such parameters (Table 7).3i
Substituting the appropriate parameters in the former formula gives
P1= .3Pnf+.7Y
In a purely inflationary situation food prices, nonfood prices, and per
capita income in current prices should all increase proportionately and
not affect the allocation of total income between food and nonfood
expenditure. Since the complete scheme of elasticities was elaborated
on the assumption that the consumer is not subject to money illusion,
the above-derived equation should possess a similar quality. The reader
may verify that if= theny == p,,f.When referring to per-
sonal disposable income the consumer price index for Lima-Callao has
usually been suggested as the proper deflator. When considering the
food and nonfood items we find that in the period 1950—54 to 1960—64
the consumer price index of food increased at 8.2 per cent annually,
whereas the price for nonfood increased at 5.3 per cent annually. Sup-
pose that real per capita incomes have increased for the blue- and white-
collar workers in the Lima-Callao area over the years. This means that
31RagnarFrisch, "A Complete Scheme for Computing All Direct- and Cross-
Demand Elasticities in a Model with Many Sectors," Econometrica, Vol. 27, pp.
177—196, April 1959.
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TABLE 7
A Complete Scheme of Direct and Cross-Price Elasticities
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per capita income in current prices must have increased more than the
weighted sum of the indexes of food prices and nonfood prices, i.e., we
have respectively
(1) Pi = +
(2) Pt >
(3) y> +
Since above equations are expressed in proportional growth rates we can
write another equation, 2b from equation 2, as follows: Pt + d =
where d is the difference in the proportional rates of growth of nonfood
prices and food, prices respectively. If food prices have increased faster
of than nonfood prices, d should be negative. Similarly equation 3 can be
he transformed into an equality by adding a parameter z
ils (3b) y =.51Pi + .49 + Z
le, If real per capita income has increased, the parameter z should be posi-
ist tive. After substituting equations 2b and 3b into equation 1 we obtain
z= — .92d
es
For the period 1950—54 to 1960—64 d equalled approximately —2.9,
and consequently real per capita incomes in the Lima-Callao area must
have increased at 2.7 per cent annually for that same period.
er Consumption patterns for the Lima metropolitan area are such that
id a quantity-weighted index will give proportionately larger weights to
•tubers, fruits, and vegetables, all of which are minor expenditure corn-
ed ponents of the typical blue-collar and white-collar food budget. On the
other hand, an expenditure-weighted index will give proportionately
er larger weights to meats and milk products, although in terms of quan-
tities bought both groups are small relative to tubers, cereals, fruits, and
as vegetables. Since the retail price of meats and milk products is deter-
he mined in international markets, an expenditure-weighted index for Lima-
64 Callao is dominated by imported food products, particularly beef. On




• Thequantity-weighted index has increased less than the expenditure-
-iat weighted index. In other words, prices of domestically produced foods
increased less on the whole than prices of imported foods between
1950—54 and 1960—64. The domestic price of the latter is determined
by the strength of the Peruvian Sol relative to the U.S. dollar and by416 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
the price trends, in terms of U.S. currency, in international markets.
Trends in the dollar price of imported foods are best measured by tak- ti
ing the ratio of the value of food imports in current dollars to the value d
of imports expressed in 1963 dollars. This ratio has been virtually con-
stant for the period 1950—64. Consequently, domestic increases in the
price of imported foods stemmed principally from the periodic devalu- p
ations of the So! (i.e., in 1953, 1957, 1958, and 1967). On the other q1
hand, price increases for domestically produced goods reflect a purely d
inflationary component coupled with the effects of shifts of the aggre- a
gate demand and supply curves for domestic food. If, after separation o
of the inflationary component, the price of domestically produced food s
should show a long-run tendency to increase, it could be argued that s
the rate of growth in demand for domestic food, at given prices and
marketing margins, was larger than the rate of growth in supply of c
domestically produced food. Evidently the proper choice of what rep- f
resents the "purely inflationary component" is of critical importance in
the above calculation.
When we take the consumer price index for Lima-Callao as equivalent S.
to the purely inflationary component, we know that the consumer price
index for domestically produced foods has increased between 7.3 and n4.
8.2 per. cent annually in the period 1950—54 to 1960—64. This range g4
indicates a relatively small, but systematic increase in the deflated price
of domestically produced food since the latter index rose more than the ol
over-all consumer price index. The observed price increase may stem
from increased marketing margins or lagging domestic production not 0
compensated by imports. A comparison of the index of farm prices 0
received for food and livestock products 32andthe Lima-Callao con-
sumer food price index,indicatesthat, whereas the former index .
increasedat 5.3 per cent annually between 195 1—55 and 1960—64, the
latter increased at 8.2 per cent annually between 1950—54 and 1960—64.
The difference between these estimates is so large that it raises serious au
doubts as to the accuracy of the observations on farm prices received alj
for food and livestock products. Ignoring the preliminary evidence on Sil
the growth of marketing margins, we will assume that the increase in the
consumer price of domestically produced food was due to lagging
domestic production. The direct price elasticity for all food in the Lima- a
Callao area was estimated to be —0.7. An increase of .9 x.7=0.63 p
per cent in the growth rate of the domestic supply would have eliminated
the observed increase in the deflated price of food.
.
32 Ministeriode Hacienda, INP, Dirección Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos, In-
dicesde Preciosa! Consumidor—Lima Metropolilana—Callao, Lima, Peru (pub-
lished quarterly since 1935).
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Thus, on the whole, it can be argued that, except for those commodi-
tiesfor which imports supplemented lagging domestic production,
e domestic supply must have responded adequately to domestic demand.
- Thisis true for corn, rice, barley, tubers, roots, fruits, vegetables, poul-
e try meat, eggs, pork, mutton. With the recent rate of growth in
- populationat close to 3 per cent annually, and the demand for food
r quite elastic in respect to both income and price, the effective aggregate
demand for food must have grown at least at 4.5 per cent annually. The
above analysis would thus cast doubt on a large body of professional
a opinion within the Peruvian public sector which considers agricultural
d supply to be a major bottleneck in economic development, at least in-
sofar as urban food provision is concerned. It also brings into question
d the accuracy of agricultural production statistics (and their derived
•f consumption series), since they indicate a virtual stagnation in domestic
• food crop production in recent years. A passive supply projection us-
ing the more recent historical series (last six years) tends to be very
gloomy with respect to the projecte4 performance of the agricultural
sector. When it takes into account a larger historical series (from 1950,
e for example), the projected performance is considerably more opti-
Id mistic, but still underestimates the independently calculated rate of
;e growth in demand.
According to our projections the GDI will increase at an annual rate
-.e of 5.1 per cent between 1960—64 (average) and 1970. The bulk of this
income formation is projected as restricted to the urban areas. Growth
of rural per capita income is primarily determined by the growth in value
of agricultural production. We did not use historical rates of rural in-
come formation but preferred a supply hypothesis that assumed a one
per cent general productivity increase in agricultural production per hec-
tare per year. Even so, rural per capita incomes are projected to increase
•1. only slowly, being virtually stagnant in the Sierra. The above projections
are not very optimistic, because they offer little hope of having a measur-
•d able impact on rural poverty, particularly in the southern and central
Sierra.
te The Agricultural Planning Office (OSPA) drew up a set of compre-
hensive supply projections that showed a marked acceleration in gross
agricultural production for food crops in general and for the Sierra in
3 particular. These projections rationalizethe philosophy behind the
National Development Plan. The projections are not consistent, how-
ever, with a regional equilibrium of commodity flows. The considerable
acceleration in rural demand would concentrate on those products in
which supply would expand relatively least (livestock products, fruits,
and vegetables). On the other hand rural demand would expand least
ii418 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
in those products in which supply would expand relatively most (tubers,
roots, cereals). Rural consumers would compete with urban workers for
a limited domestic supply of livestock products, fruits, and vegetables,
using as payment the marketable surplus in tubers, roots, and cereals.
The Sierra would become a net importer of livestock products and a net
exporter of cereals—a reversal of traditional commodity flows.
We did not have the necessary price-quantity relationships to work
out the precise equilibrium solution. For the larger cities the direct price
elasticity for all food equalled —0.8. The direct price elasticity for
cereals was —0.4 and for tubers and roots —0.7. Commercial margins
for farm products are a multiple of the on-farm value. Consequently
market demand at the farm level is quite price inelastic for crops like
tubers, roots, and cereals. The projected surplus over home consump-
tion and urban demand would actually yield a decreasing cash income.
Undoubtedly, this would tend to defeat the government's effort to ex-
pand production beyond an economically justifiable limit. Table 8 pre-
sents the projected annual growth rates in per capita GD! used in the
demand projections.
Table 9 presents the projected cumulative annual growth rates in
quantitative demands for various food groups by the rural and urban
population in each of the four regions between 1960—64 and 1970.
It can be seen that the demand for food will grow almost explosively in
both the coastal region and Selva, while the Sierra registers a substan-
tially lower expansion. For the Republic, as a whole, demand in almost
all food groups will expand at a rate well beyond 4 per cent per year.
The agricultural sector must have a considerable capacity to expand
production if it is to meet this challenge. Because of the pattern of in-
come and population growth, the demand for the staple food crops of
TABLE 8
Projected Growth in Per Capita Gross Domestic Income,
Urban and Rural, by Regions, 1960—64 (average) to 1970
(annual geometric rates)
Coast Sierra Selva Republic
Urban 3.9 1.8 2.7 3.2
RuraL 2.0 0.5 2.0 1.0



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































420 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
the Sierra grows relatively the least, while the demand for the typical in
food crops of the Coast and Selva will grow relatively the most. Conse- ra
quently, in agricultural promotion programs consideration might well be he'
given to a reallocation of resources determined by future deficits in Ut
domestic production. This would almost certainly increase the propor- in
tion of public expenditure allocated to the Coast, an increase that would yi
be in the interest of the urban consumer. On the other hand, increased ye
allocation of public expenditure in the Sierra is the only active instru- Wi
ment available to the government to alleviate rural poverty. Whether
public expenditure should be used to promote urban or rural interests
is essentially a political decision. In the past the government has tried th
to satisfy both the urban consumer and rural food producers. We pre- be
dict a continuation of that compromise. W:
10
re
Projection of Land Productivity
Except for export crops, average yield levels have been virtually constant Si
between 1950 and 1964. Percentage changes in annual productivity W
fell within a range of 0.5 per cent around a zero average. Considering
that agricultural statistics in Peru contain a large error of observation, ce4
it would be defensible to maintain that neither group of crops showed
significant productivity increases. This fact conditioned our assumptions
concerning possible increases in the future. We consider that within the
period 1960—64 to 1970 productivity increases cannot reasonably cx- bq
ceed a cumulative rate of 2 per cent per year. Individual crops may
U
exceed this rate, as may groups of crops, but the rate of growth in the te
aggregate yield index will fall within the upper limit of 2 per cent.
Indeed, it might have been more realistic to accept the historical rate
of increase of close to zero per cent. The aggregate yield index and its
components show, however, a relatively low value for the mid 1950's
when compared to either the early 1950's or early 1960's. A yield index au
for the years 1956—64 would show an over-all productivity increase
equal to approximately one per cent per year. CO
Reporting of agricultural statistics does not involve a direct field- p
sampling of yield levels. Estimates by districts for basic crops were re- a
ported annually by part-time field investigators. Both the number of i4
fieldreporters and the means of transporting them were limited in rela- tiL
tion to the magnitude of the task. Communicaton between workers in the
field and in the Ministry of Agriculture lacked feedback. Certain obvious
errors were corrected after receipt of field data but no trend analysis, (a
comparisonswith previous years, or secondary sources were consulted ('




in constructing the final series. Since the field staff was subject to a high
rate of turnover and received little guidance or material support from
:e headquarters in Lima, year-to-year reports show fluctuations that are
unacceptable by any criterion. Aggregation of district data into depart-
mental data still gives unacceptable results. A correlation analysis of
d yield trends between departments produced coefficients of determination
d very close to zero. A correlation analysis of yield trends between crops
within the same department also gives nonsignificant results.
Analysis of each series at the departmental level was therefore not
possible. Nor did we think that detailed considerations of each year at
d the national level would be useful. Instead, we choose to compare the
beginning and ending five-year periods of the fifteen-year series 1950—64.
We felt that a wider historical perspective was more likely to reveal true
• long-term trends. Standard linear-regression analysis on the same data
resulted in coefficients of determination that, in the majority of cases,
were not statistically significant, confirming implicitly that no statistically
it significant trends would be detected. In many cases, trend coefficients
were obtained that indicated either rapid productivity increases or de-
creases. Despite their magnitude such coefficients would have been ac-
ceptable under the hypothesis that the true trend coefficient equaled
zero.
• The simplest hypothesis, for projection purposes, was that, for the
-te majority of the eleven basic crops, yield productivity had not increased
between 1950 and 1964 and that the next ten years would see a contin-
uation of this stagnation. (For a few crops known to have been charac- •
terizedby continuous adoption of yield-improving varieties and commer-
cial inputs, a discretionary productivity increase could have been deter-
C mined.) We did not seriously consider adopting this simple hypothesis
because it appeared too pessimistic for use in long-term projections.
'S There remained two alternatives: (1) to take the basic data seriously
x and devise a method of analysis that would filter out the erratic nature
of the data, or (2) to consult with agronomists and other experts and
compile, in some systematic manner, their views on the probable im-
provements in yield levels. We explored both alternatives but adopted
alternative one. In a series of meetings sponsored by the Agricultural
Planning Office (OSPA),33 technical experts of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture set down their views on probable short-run yield improvements.
These experts were principally from the Agricultural Research,
Ministerio de Agricultura, OSPA, Previsiones del Desarrollo de la Of eric y de
Ia Demande de los ProductosAgropecuarios1967—1970, Lima, Peru,1967
(mimeo.).
•Is
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Extension, and Development Service (SIPA), the Office of Land Reform yiel
and Colonization (ONRA), the Agricultural Credit Bank (Banco de esti
Fomento Agropecuario) and various organizations representing producer
interests. The estimates presented by these technicians were uniformly
optimistic. There are two explanations for this. First, many of the ex- of
perts tended to confuse yield potential with probable yields. Their per- hay
sonal experience was mostly with experimental yield improvement, and
it proved to be impossible to translate this knowledge systematically into in 1
aforecast of actual yield improvements. Second, some of the estimates eco:
were undoubtedly influenced by the desire to get additional funds for
their respective agencies' growth. This created pressure to overestimate difr
program impacts and to underestimate the costs of carrying out stated
objectives. .1
As a substitute for the above procedure we explored three general agri
yield hypotheses, i.e., the yield index of the eleven basic food crops was poli
assumed to increase respectively at zero, 1, or 2 per cent per year. The gov
projections were carried out in two independent stages. The first stage to r
was the selection of one of the above three general productivity hypoth- in p
eses. The second stage consisted in projecting the component crops of
the yield index. Once the general yield index is selected, these component
projections can be used to compute the projected yield level of individual neo
crops or the projected yield index of groups of crops. cob
The important feature of this method is that once the general produc- capi
tivity hypothesis is chosen, all yield levels are simultaneously determined. tivit
This does not mean that all yields will increase proportionately. On the nin&.
contrary, some will increase substantially more than the average, while prod
others may actually decrease. However, all indilvidual crop yields are prod
assumed to vary positively in accordance with the magnitude of the and
general productivity hypothesized. Hence, under the 2 per cent general
productivity hypothesis all crop yields will increase faster (or decrease tionq
less) than under the one per cent hypothesis. There is good reason to be by
suspicious of any long-run productivity increase exceeding a rate of 4 per in °i
cent per year for any particular crop. For groups of crops the long-run into
productivity increase cannot reasonably exceed 2—3 per cent per year. natu4
On the other hand, with a great many crops using a minimum level of TI
commercial inputs, one should be skeptical of long-run productivity de-
creases exceeding more than 2 per cent per year for particular crops or that(;
zero per cent for groups of crops.
With the method of simultaneous adopted, it was not nec-
essary to invoke the above qualitative considerations. Projected rates of the
yield increases all fell within preestablished limits. While the projected 34
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)flfl yield increases may have a margin of error, we think it the best possible
de estimate in view of the nature of the basic data.
icer Division of Peru into three regions based on ecological criteria—the
rnly Coast, Sierra, and Selva—is also useful for analyzing the development
ex- of agricultural supply in the last two decades. Yields for the same crop
have increased at different rates in the three regions, and are likely to
and continue to do so for the next ten years. The explanation must be sought
in the radical differences between these regions in respect to socio-
economic conditions, natural productivity of the land, transportation
for costs, and government involvement in agriculture. Most of the above
'iate differences have a persistence that will carry them well beyond the
ted horizon of the development plan.
There are activities such as agricultural extension and development,
agrarian reform and agricultural credit that are in the domain of public
was policy and can therefore be redirected at will. However, the Peruvian
[he government has not disposed of the necessary funds, nor even chosen
age to reallocate what funds are available, in such a fashion that increases
)th in productivity of the existing land base would be maximized. In our
of projections we assume a continuation of that choice, since the need for
tent productivity increases will continue to be small relative to the social
Lual necessity of agrarian reform and to competing activities in irrigation and
colonization. On balance, therefore, a historical projection is likely to
-.uc- capture the principal effects of the conditions that influence land produc-
ted. tivity. Furthermore, the strategic issues in agricultural development plan-
the ning and foreign aid are centered around the relationship of cost of
bile productivity increases to cost of land expansion. In this study, national
are production was estimated as the sum of independent projections in yield
the and acreage, where possible, on a regional basis.
Yield levels were first projected at the national level only. The na-
ase tional yield projections were then translated into projected yield levels
• be by natural regions. The three general hypotheses as to projected increases
per in over-all productivity at the national level could then be translated
run into a set of specific yield projections for eleven basic crops by three
ear. natural regions (see Table 10).
of Table 11 is based upon the detailed project plans of the agricultural
de- promotion service (SIPA) for the year From this it can be seen
or
• thatthe land area involved in extension programs is approximately 8 per
cent of the projected total cultivated area for that year. The area per
tec- farm unit subject to extension will average 1.2 hectares, indicating that
of the extension effort is to be directed largely towards small farmers. If







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































o426 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
these programs are not carried out, the yield level of cereals projected
for 1970 would have to be lowered by 5 per cent, that of tubers and
roots by almost 3 per cent, that of beans and pulses by a little over r
3 per cent and that of all basic food crops by 3 per cent. Since 1960—64
is the base period of the above projection, the induced acceleration in
yield increases through public productivity programs is less than 0.5 per
cent annually. In terms of 1964 farm prices the additional farm value
produced in 1970 would equal 294 million soles.
The financial resources projected necessary to carry the programs out
in 1970 equal 162 million soles in terms of 1964 prices (see Table 12).
These figures suggest that the cost and return relationships in productiv-
ity programs are satisfactory. Additional food production can therefore
be obtained in a straightforward manner through funds allocated in agri-
cultural research and extension. The Peruvian government however has
not put a high priority on this objective.
In order to achieve an annual 2 per cent increase in the yield index p
of eleven basic crops, approximately 460 million soles would have to be s
allocated to the agricultural research and extension service in 1970. Sb
Available expenditure in 1970 for all programs of the Agricultural Ex-
tension and Research Service (SIPA) is projected to be within a range
of 130—150 million soles (see Table 4). However, only a fraction of
this will be allocated to cereals, tubers, roots, beans, and pulses since
the momentum of other existing programs will also have to be main-
tained.
TABLE 12
Projected Financial Resources Required in 1970 to Achieve
Productivity Levels According to
Stated General-Productivity Hypotheses






Hypothesis 2 125.8 75.8 4.9 206.5
Required to achieve
Hypothesis 3 276.7 160.1 23.1 459.9
























Cereals 77.7 14.7 18.4 30.9 13.2 —
Tubers 47.8 8.3 9.3 17.4 12.7 —
Beans andpulses36.1 5.5 7.4 11.6 11.7 —
Fruits 51.5 9.1 19.1 11.2 12.0 —
Vegetables 14.0 2.0 2.5 4.2 5.3 —
Poultry 30.7 4.1 3.0 8.7 0.7 14.2
Beef and milk 55.2 7.1 15.0 3.0 2.0 28.2
Sheep and Alpaca24.4 3.5 2.9 7.4 0.7 10.0
Total products337.554.4 77.4 94.5 58.3 52.3
Total SIPA 462.374.6 106.1129.4 79.9 71.7
Source: See Table ii.
The financial resources required by all of the planned programs of
SIPA in 1970 would equal 462 million soles (see Table 13). Cereals,
tubers, beans and pulses constitute only 35percent of the total SIPA
budget. Since the financial resources available for SIPA will probably not
exceed 150 million soles, the proposed programs cannot be executed
on the scale originally planned. Assuming a proportional cutback in all
programs, the expenditure available for those in cereals, tubers, beans,
and pulses is projected not to exceed 52.5millionsoles, indicating that
allocated public exnenaiture is too small to have a notable impact on
productivity improvement. Of the total funds available to SIPA approxi-
mately 28 per cent are put into extension, the rest being used for re-
search, development, and administration. On a regional basis plans are
for approximately 40 per cent to be allocated to the Sierra, 24 per cent
to the Selva, and the remaining 36 per cent to the Coast (see Table 14).
As the allocation of funds among programs, activities, and
Ministerio de Agricultura, SIPA, Oficina de Planeamiento, Programación y
Presupuesto, Gasios Segtin Per Departamentos, Ju!io 1962—Junio 1966,
Lima, Peru, 1967 (memorandum submitted to the Agricultural Sectoral Planning
Office).
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TABLE 13
d
Projected Financial Resources Needed for Eight Productivity
Programs of The Agricultural Extension and Research Service by 1970












.5Coast Sierra Selva Republic
Administration 27.2 39.5 33.3 100.0
Research 14.0 44.6 41.4 100.0
Crop development 74.0 21.3 4.7 100.0
Livestock development 27.9 41.4 30.7 100.0
Extension 36.1 52.3 11.6 100.0
Total 35.1 40.9 24.0 100.0
Source:See Table Ii.
regions is not necessarily optimal, because of the extent to which such
allocations are necessarily governed by political and professional inter-
actions. We are now completing a regional linear-programming model
for potatoes in order to determine the optimum allocation of public in-
vestment funds consistent with (1) a maximum increase in production
for a given total public expenditure in extension and development pro-
grams, and (2) projected changes in demand, supply, and costs of pro-
duction. By comparing the actual allocation with the optimal allocation
we hope to obtain a dollar estimate of the potential monetary benefits
foregone under the present allocation. The recently introduced Agricul-
tural Promotion Law calls specifically for land use zoning along the
foregoing lines. By systematically executing similar studies on other crop
and livestock programs we hope to obtain a more rational allocation of
agency funds among the various programs. However, this still leaves
unsettled the strategic planning decision concerning the balance between
administration, research, development, and extension.
PROJECTED LAND EXPANSION
The land and water available in Peru are adequate to the needs of domes-
tic production. Other Latin American countries, however, possess a
much more accessible agricultural-resource base than Peru. Agricultural
land under cultivation in 1964 equalled 2.1 million hectares. Half of this
•
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TABLE 14
Projected Percentage Composition of Expenditure on








was in the Sierra, one-third in the Coast, and the rest in the Selva.36 The
land/man ratio in Peru is low when compared to other countries, devel-
oped or underdeveloped. One of the first tasks of the Agricultural Plan-
ning Office (OSPA) was to elaborate an inventory of land expansion
projects. This was released by the Peruvian government as part of a plan
to increase cultivated area by one million hectares by There does
not appear to be a strong need for such a drastic increase. In fact the
rate of actual land expansion created through public investment is lower
now than in the preceding fifteen years.38 We feel that the concept of
land/man ratio must be interpreted very cautiously. In itself, it does not
indicate land scarcity or land surplus.
Livestock contributes only 25 per cent to the gross value of agricul-
tural production. Sheep, hogs, and poultry are of minor importance. Most
of the cattle and sheep are raised and fattened on the natural pastures
• of the Sierra highlands. Only the poultry industry has created a derived
demand for feeds such as corn, but this crop must compete with the
• byproducts of rice, wheat, and cotton. Apart from export crops, culti-
• vated land in Peru produces crops destined for direct human consump-
tion. A relatively small acreage is therefore sufficient to meet the needs
of domestic demand.
•- Theland/man ratio is a fairly stable coefficient for a given country.
a This coefficient is subject to a secular trend, which while it cannot always
be easily explained, is certainly predictable. Cultivated land expands be-
- causethere is a demand for food and industrial crops. Whether this
a demand is generated domestically or externally makes little difference.
The demand is met either through productivity increases on existing land
- orthrough expansion of the land base. In most underdeveloped countries
increased demand for agricultural products has been met traditionally
through expansion of the land base. Peru is no exception. Large areas,
particularly in the Selva, have only recently been explored, and a land
inventory for Peru is of necessity subject to constant upward revision.
• Coupled with the absence of hard knowledge about unexplored areas,
n there exists the uncertainty about the agricultural potential of traditional
production areas. The report of a recent study by ONERN on Puno
mentions that the agricultural potential of the Altiplano for crop use has
been considerably underestimated
EstadlsticaAgraria 1964, Lima, Peru, 1965.
Ministerio de Agricultura, OSPA,Inventariode Proyectos para
8- elArea Cultivada en un Millón de Hectareas, Lima, Peru, 1965.
a 38JoséA. Salaverry Liosa, Superficie Agropecuaria—Uso Actual y Potencial,
11 CONESTCAR,Lima,Peru, 1967 (mimeo.).
ONERN, Programade Ins'eniario y Evaluacián de los Recursos Naturales del
Departamento de Puno, Vol. 5, Lima, Peru, 1965.T.
430 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
It is generally conceded that Peruvian agricultural statistics underre-
port the actual acreage under cultivation, particularly for the Sierra and
the Selva.4° Even in the coastal area land growth has been considerably
underestimated, and it is only in the last two years that comprehensive
cartographic surveys have revealed true land use. It is not therefore a
question of whether Peru's land potential is exhausted, but rather of
whether, in meeting growing demand, economic conditions will dictate a
new trend towards productivity increases or a continuation of the former
pattern of new land development. The public sector can have an influ-
ence in determining which direction will be taken, but it cannot by its
own efforts insure the final outcome in terms of production achieved.
With respect to the land/man ratio there is an historical trend from
which we decided not to deviate too radically. A geometric projection
taking 1953 and 1962 as base years would have put the land/man ratio
for the eleven basic crops at 0.1385 in 1970. The actual value adopted
equals 0.1272 (see Table 15). This more conservative estimate resulted
from the following considerations. The area for industrial crops in the
coastal region has shown a considerable slowing down in its rate of
expansion; in fact we project this area in 1970 to be slightly smaller
than its 1960—64 average size. On the other hand, coastal population
is growing well above the national average. This will cause a rapid expan-
sion in the market for domestically grown food crops in the coastal re-
gion, an expansion accelerated by adverse market conditions for export
crops. Hence, it seemed reasonable, in view of the substitution of food
crops for cotton in land utilization, to set the land/man ratio for food
crops in the coastal region at slightly below the indication of its histori-
cal trend. On the other hand, there was no need to deviate from the
historical trend in regard to cotton, whose falling land/man ratio reflects
a considerable decline of the relative importance of this crop.
Cultivated acreage in the Sierra is almost exclusively allocated to food
crops. Certain valleys produce a substantial quantity of products that
are consumed in the urban centers of the coastal region and the Sierra.4'
Nevertheless, in the absence of statistics on interregional trade move-
ments, it seemed prudent to assume that in the Sierra cultivated acreage
would expand almost proportionally to population. This puts no undue
40 See Eduardo Watson Cisneros, Situacidn de las Estadisticas Agropecuarias
en el Perd, CONESTCAR,Lima,Peru, 1964; and Shane Hunt, Peruvian Agricultural
Production1944—1962, Reportsubmitted to the National Income Accounts Di-
vision of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru, Lima, 1963.
41 Ministerio de Agricultura, SIPA,Oficinade Estudios Economicos, Abasteci-
,piiento y Promedio de Precios de ProductosAgrIcolasen las Ca,npãnas AgrIcolas








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2432 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
strain upon known, available land resources. Given the fact that agricul-
is' tural statistics tend to underreport actual acreage in production, the
Si
adopted estimate is conservative.
In the Selva cultivated acreage is determined almost wholly by regional
es
population growth. The export potential of the Selva in food crops is
M
dubious and historically has been nonsignificant. The construction of new cr
penetration roads, notably the Carretera Marginal, will foster a great deal
of spontaneous and government-directed colonization. Therefore, even
ca
with the high rate of population growth in the Selva region, it appears
lis
quite feasible to maintain historical land/man ratios, except in cotton.
' b
Using the above independent regional considerations, we computed the
dependent national average. In the ratio for food crops we found an
almost linear decrease, but there was a drastic reversal for industrial
crops when the projected period (1960—64 to 1970) is compared with
1951—55to 1960—64. an
In the foregoing determination we were guided by the growth in total
population by regions, and we expressed implicitly that the three natural
regions of Peru are, on balance, self-sufficient with respect to production be
of the eleven basic food stuffs included in our study. This is only approxi- re
mately true with respect to the urban population but substantially true
for the rural population, as the regional consumption and production
patterns of the above crops show. se
Given that the Sierra region is predominantly noncommercial in food se
crop production and, on balance, has tended to have reduced yield levels, In
it appears reasonable that the cultivated acreage in that region should
increase at a rate not less than that of rural population. Census data of
show that a very high proportion of the rural population, almost regard- av4
less of age, is classified as agriculturally active.42 In other words, the
agricultural labor force in the Sierra is nearly identical with its rural
population. The land/man ratio projection (with respect to the rural
population)adopted for the Sierra can be seen to correspond closely to mel
its historical tendency. The populations of both the coastal region and ac
Selva have rapidly become more urban. Ceteris paribus, the land/man ag
ratio when divided into rural population will tend to increase. This tend- Ii
ency is less for the Coast than for the Selva because of the stagnation
in export crops. cu,
Until 1962, statistics on cultivated acreage were collected and pub-
lished by the Dirección de EconomIa Agraria, an entity within the Min-
42Ministerio de Hacienda, Dirección Nacional de Estadistica y Censos,
SextoCenso Nacionalde PoblaciOn, 2 de Junio 1961, Resultados de Primera
Prioridad,Lima,Peru, 1964. Ten4 ThePeruvian Experience 433
istry of Agriculture. The Agricultural Census of 1961revealed con-
e siderable differences between the estimates of the DEA and those of the
Ministry of Agriculture, and this led to a complete revision of the Census
ii estimates. In 1963 a cooperative agreement was signed between the
• Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural University at La Molina
w creating CONESTCAR." This office was charged with reporting agri-
ii cultural statistics, executing periodic agricultural censuses, and doing the
n cartographic work basic to crop area estimation. The DEA did not pub-
lish estimates for 1963, but CONESTCAR obtained provisional estimates
1. by means of a linear regression on the DEA 1959—62 series. A subse-
quent subsample of the census data led to comprehensive revisions in
n many series for the period Data for 1965 and 1966 have not
yet been published. The 1964 revisions, for such basic food crops as
b potatoes and corn, are a compromise between the low census estimates
and the higher estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture. Cartographic
surveys for the coastal valleys have substantially improved crop area
ii estimation. However, to date, no such substantial improvements have
fl been introduced into the methods of measuring yields per hectare. With
i- respect to the Sierra and Selva region, data reporting has been reorgan-
ized since 1964, but it has not necessarily been improved.
'U In our projections we have made uniform use of the five-year time
series published by CONESTCAR in its Estadlstica Agraria 1964. Time
series prior to 1960 are identical to those used by the National Planning
S, Institute in elaborating national income accounts. These series were pre-
pared by the Planning Office in the Ministry of Agriculture in the light
of the results of the 1961 Census and of additional information made
1- available from the Caja de Depositos, SIPA and the Superintendencia de
Abastecimientos.46 It is evident that the adjustments are somewhat arbi-
al trary since they were made after the fact and on the national level only.
al With the existing acreage-reporting system, it is virtually impossible to
:0 measure reliably (i.e., within a 3 per cent margin) increases in cultivated
acreage. Observations are necessarily fairly gross. A comparison of acre-
in age reports from SIPA and CONESTCAR for the same region shows
•1- little or no directional correlation.
Our work on demand has given us good reason to believe that the
current CONESTCAR series for the period 1960—64 underestimate the
Ministerio de Hacienda, INP, Dirección Nacional de EstadIstica y Censos,
Primer Censo Nacional Agropecuario, Lima, Peru, 1965.
44Convenio de Cooperación Tdcnica, EstadIstica y CartografIa.
CONESTCAR, Muestreo Agropecuario Naciortal, Lima, Peru, 1964.
46Ministeriode Agricultura, Oficina de Planeamiento, Comisión Análisis de
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actual expansion in domestic agricultural production for that period. t
Projections to 1970 based upon these series tend to be unduly pessimistic e
and have given rise among foreign and Peruvian economists to an undue I
tendency to consider the agricultural sector stagnant. The last figures
published by the DEA related to 1962, and the first original figure t
emanating from CONESTCAR will relate to 1965. Apart from
the difficulty of reporting relatively small changes in acreage between I
years, there is the problem of establishing a comprehensive base estimate.
C
The diverse and scattered nature of cultivated acreage in Peru is such
that only a comprehensive aerographic survey could provide the neces-
C
sary base. For fully 70 per cent of the cultivated acreage of Peru such
an estimate is still lacking. Crop area estimation for 1965 must therefore
1
be guided by previous results, with a good chance that in the process of
S
"guestimating" many small figures, the aggregated total will show sur-
prising stability. Without the comprehensive 1964 publication of CO-
NESTCAR the present projections would have been difficult if not im- t
possible. It is equally true, however, that no matter how efficiently and
comprehensively elaborated, bad field data will produce information of
doubtful value independently of its level of aggregation.
Climatic factors in Peru are a very important and much ignored deter-
minant of cultivated acreage. They affect all crops, if not equally, cer- r
tainly to a considerable extent. The availability of water in the coastal
region depends on precipitation in the Sierra where a drought inevitably
creates scarcity of water for irrigation in the former region. A three-year . I
moving average of annual discharges of the fifteen major rivers along
C
the Peruvian coast revealed a remarkably consistent seven-year cycle.
The relationship between inadequate precipitation and cultivated acreage I
is quite direct, e.g., for rice in the coastal region and for potatoes in the t
Sierra. While cyclical climatic factors are so marked that they affect all t
crops to some extent, it does not necessarily follow that they determine
S
long-run trends in acreage or overshadow such trends as a factor in food t
supply projection. If this were so, a projection of supply would be de-
pendent upon an accurate long-range weather forecast. Nevertheless, in '
theyears covered by the Agricultural Development Plan a cyclical in-
crease in water availability in the Sierra and in the coastal region is
projected. Hence, the rather optimistic production projections of the
plan might be borne out because of essentially exogenous developments.
Year-to-year fluctuations in reported acreage are relatively large. A
standard linear or geometric regression yields coefficients of determina- I tion which, while statistically significant, are too low to be acceptable
for forecasting. Other series (e.g., fruits and vegetables) constructed byw
4
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theMinistry of Agriculture on the basis of judgment yield higher co-
efficients of determination, but were excluded from the present analysis.
Because components of the projections were unreliable, nothing could be
e gained by grouping individual projections, summing the groups and ob-
S taminga group total. The total estimated acreage might accidentally
• e yield a land/man ratio in line with historical trends, but this could not
a be guaranteed. Second, even if the total estimated acreage behaved ac-
cording to expectations, this would not guarantee that its components
would. Such a guarantee could be made only if a simple trend analysis
h consistently revealed high coefficients of determination. Since our ideas
on projected total acreage were relatively firm, we adopted a method for
h imposing a restriction upon the total cultivated acreage by regions by
simultaneously determining the historical evolution in the composition
of acreage by groups of crops, and crops separately.
• The projections, then, took place in two independent stages: the first,
)_ todetermine the total acreage, and the second to determine the corn-
position of the total acreage. Hence, we could introduce a number of
hypotheses on land development and rapidly calculate the acreage of
each crop, by region, using the independent estimate on composition.
• The composition of cultivated acreage within a given region has remained
remarkably stable over the years; in other words expansion of cultivated
acreage has been roughly proportional for all crops.
To obtain a more exact idea of the trends governing the relative corn-
position of crop acreage we adopted the following procedure. Individual
Ir crops were put into groups. The cereals group comprised rice, corn,
wheat, barley, quinua, and cañahua. The bean and pulse group com-
prised beans, horse beans, broad beans, chickpeas, peas, and lentils. The
tuber and roots group comprised white and yellow potatoes, sweet pota-
til toes, manioc, oca, olluco and mashua; and the industrial crops group
sugarcane, cotton, and tobacco. Projections for coffee, fruits, and vege-
tables were not included as part of the simultaneous acreage projections.
The acreage of each crop and each group of crops was listed for the
quinquennium 1951—55 and the quinquennium 1960—64, using adjusted
DEA data for the first period and CONESTCAR data for the second.
is The acreage of each crop was listed separately by regions as well as by
the the national total. Then the percentage composition of each group within
ts a given region was determined. The national totals were not computed,
• since the composition of these totals in the set of projections is derived
•ta- from separate projections of total acreage and its composition by regions.
•le To obtain two points for projections we computed the average composi-
•
tion for each of the two above-mentioned five-year intervals. In each case
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the sum of the components must equal 100 per cent. Assuming the corn-
position of acreage to change linearly, it follows that by a simple linear
extrapolation, the 1970 composition can be determined. Given the pro-
jected total acreage for a food group, it is then very simple to compute
the projected acreage for each crop.
The above procedure for separate crops can also be applied to groups
of crops. It has the advantage of permitting the analysis of composition
1
to be carried out separately from projecting the total cultivated acreage
grown. In general, accuracy in the projection of total cultivated acreage 8
is more critical to the over-all conclusions of the study than accuracy in g
the projection of acreage of any single crop. The method used allowed
us to concentrate on the strategic decision concerning the projected man/
land ratio and to use this as an imposed condition within which group-
and crop-acreage estimates were accommodated. No conventional meth-
ods of statistical analysis were used in acreage projections, primarily be-
cause time series data in Peru are subject to error. We ëould have applied
traditional regression analysis on the relative composition of acreage.
While individual percentage trends might not necessarily sum to 100 per
cent, a number of trials indicated the differences to be very small. 1
Table 16 indicates that the average annual expansion in land under c
cultivation between 1960—64 and 1970 should equal 37,680 hectares.
Approximately 35 per cent of this expansion is projected to take place t
TABLE 16
Projected Average Annual increase in Cultivated Area by 1
Cropsin the Three Regions, 1960—64 to 1970 s
(in thousands of hectares)
t
Crop Coast Sierra Selva Republic
Cereals 7.73 9.17 2.86 19.76
Tubers and Roots 0.56 6.16 3.46 10.18
Beans and Pulses 2.07 1.64 0.63 4.34
Fruits 1.84 0.45 2.22 4.51
Vegetables 0.81 0.64 0.06 1.51
Total food crops 13.01 18.06 9.23 40.30
Industrial crops —3.22 0.17 0.43 —2.62
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in the coastal region. We believe that, because of the substantial elasticity
x in the use of available land resources, the projected increases in both
•,_ theSierra and Selva could take place without major direct public invest-
e ment. Between 1950 and 1964 land under cultivation in the coastal re-
gion expanded by 273,000 hectares.47 Irrigation of newly created land
•s accounted for 75,000 hectares. An almost equal expansion was achieved
• n by improving the irrigation systems on existing land. Water storage and
utilization of underground water permitted an increase in cultivation of
85,000 hectares. River defense work, drainage projects, and small irri-
n gation projects created an additional 35,000 hectares.48 The figures on
•id newly irrigated land and improved land do not include many small pri-
vate projects.
Virtually all large-scale irrigation projects and improvements in the
1- irrigation systems of adjoining valleys were financed by the public sector.
• The costs of building or improving irrigation systems were relatively low.
A detailed study of the expenditure accounts of the Ministry of Develop-
ment revealed that for fifteen completed large-scale coastal irrigation
projects the installed cost per irrigated hectare equalled 22,000 soles (in
1963 prices, see Table 17). Improvements of existing irrigation systems
- cost on an average 6,500 soles per hectare (in 1963 prices). The average
s. period of construction for these fifteen projects was eleven and four-
tenths years.49 Public investment in irrigation has fluctuated considerably
because of the tendency to initiate projects in bunches.
Nevertheless, public investment in irrigation has shown a marked
tendency to decline in relation to total public investment and even more
so in relation to total government expenditure. Future irrigation works
will all be large scale and their estimated cost per hectare, including
• the improvement of existing irrigation systems, will vary from 40,000
soles per hectare to 26,000 soles per hectare depending on the propor-
ic tion of new and improved land (see Table 18)
McGaughey'sstudies on the profitability of proposed irrigation proj-
ects show that with an annual rate of discount of 10 per cent, the result-
ing benefit-cost ratios are less than 1.8 and as low as 0.6. A first com-
parison with benefit-cost ratios obtained in productivity programs mdi-
Liosa,op. cit.
48 MarioCtTheo Mimbela, P/an de Desarrollo Agropecuario—Programa Irriga-
ción, Ministerio de Agricultura, OSPA, Lima, Peru, 1967.
JoséA. Salaverry Liosa, Inversiones en Obras, Esiudios,Irrigaciones y
Mejoramiento de Riego 1944—1 966, CONESTCAR, Lima, Peru, 1967 (mimeo.).
50StephenMcGaughey, Evaluación deProyectos,lnformación Requerida,
Criterios y Prioridades, Iowa Universities Mission to Peru in cooperation with the

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) Olmos 86,75186,751 — 49,300 —
(2) Choclococha36,5008,50028,000 25,900 —
(3) Tumbes 19,46012,3157,145 28,900 —
(4) Moquequa 6,7503,0803,670 49,300 —
(5) Majes 57,00057,000 — 64,900 —
Small irrigation
(6) Pampa Dorada1,185 1,185 — 105,800 —
(7) Majes 3,3101,7801,530 77,600 —
(8) Camana 1,815 2101,605 26,700 —
(9) Tamba 2,270 5051,765 30,000 —
(10) Ibera 880 880 — 23,000 —
(11)Chococo 1,523 — 1,523 18,600 —
(12) Anaura 1,175 — 1,175 6,400 —
(13)HuansocoUa 925 — 925 15,000 —
All projects 219,544172,20647,338 47,304
Alternative project
groups
A (no's 1—3) 142,711 — — — 40,500
B (no's'1—3;8—13)151,301 — — — 39,900
C (no's 7—13) 11,900 — — — 37,300
D (no's 2,3,8—13)64,550 — — — 26,037
E (undetermined) — — — — —
I.
Source: Stephen McGauhey, Iowa Universities Missionto Peru,
Lima, 1967.
S
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cates that a dollar of public expenditure on improving yields will give
the greater return.5' However data on cost and returns for productivity
programs are not yet as reliable as similar data for irrigation projects.
We are fairly certain that the stated returns on productivity programs
are too optimistic. On balance, therefore, one cannot recommend public
investment in proUuctivity programs over irrigation projects with any
degree of certainty. However, there are secondary considerations that
favor productivity programs. The programs are divisible and can be
located anywhere in the Republic, whereas irrigation projects are tied to
a specific location in the coastal region and have a long gestation period.
Irrigation projects require a substantial commitment of public invest-
ment over a considerable period of time. Because of the large initial
capital requirements of such projects and the limited internal sources of
finance for them, the Peruvian government will have to rely on external
financing if it wants to pursue a vigorous land expansion policy in the
coastal region. International agencies have financed a large number of
feasibility studies in recent years, but have been reluctant to finance the
foreign exchange cost of any large-scale project.
Public investment projected available for irrigation activities in 1970
equals 157 million soles. Assuming that most feasibility studies will have
been completed by 1970, substantially all funds will be available for
newly irrigated or improved land. At the average cost of 30,000 soles
per hectare for current projects in their terminal stages, the projected
funds would create an additional 5.3thousandhectares of cultivation in
1970. Since irrigated land is at least double cropped, the projected in-
crease will bring a minimum of 8,000 hectares under cultivation. Water
storage, underground water utilization, and small irrigation projects
could easily generate another 3,000 hectares of cultivation in 1970.
The projected total increase of 11,000 hectares offsets the needed in-
crease of 9,800 hectares in cultivated land in the coastal region.
PROJECTED FEASIBLE GROWTH
IN PRODUCTION
Given the projected yields and acreages by crops and regions, it is a
simple matter to determine the projected rates of growth in production
(see Table 20). We used 1964 farm prices as specified by regions in
51Seepp. 426—27 and Delbert A. Fitchett, investment Strategies in Peruvian
Agriculture: SomeRecentExperiences in Development Planning, Memorandum
prepared by the Rand Corporation for the Agency of International Development,
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TABLE 20
Projected Growth in the Value of Agricultural Production by Groups
of Crops for the Three Natural Regions, 1960—64 to 1970,
According to Three Yield Hypotheses
(cumulative annual rates)
CoastSierraSelvaRepublic
Hypothesis 1 —0 yield
increase per year
Food crops 4.4 1.3 4.1 2.6
Industrials 0.6 3.4 3.6 1.3
All crops 1.9 1.4 5.0 2.0
Hypothesis 2 —Iper cent yield
increase per year
Food crops 4.9 2.3 4.6 3.3
Industrials 1.0 3.4 3.6 1.5
All crops 2.3 2.3 5.2 2.6
Hypothesis 3 —2per cent yield
increase per year
Food crops 7.0 3.0 5.7 4.2
Industrials 2.2 3.5 3.6 2.4
All crops 3.9 3.0 5.8 3.4
the EstadIstica Agraria 1964 to determine the growth rates in value
aggregates.
The value of all crops produced in the Republic is expected to grow
between 2 and 3.4 per cent annually, barring exogenous factors such as
major devaluations and the effects of the weather cycle. Projected public
funds for agricultural research and promotion will not be sufficient to
attain a yield increase of 1 per cent per year (hypothesis 2). Hence,
food production is expected to grow at approximately 3 per cent per
year. Both the Coast and Selva are projected to achieve substantial rates
of growth in food production, but in the Sierra expansion in food crop
pro4uction is not expected to exceed 2 per cent annually.
In general the rates of growth in food production tend to be very close
to the projected rates of growth in population by regions and for the
Republic. Unless public investment in agriculture is increased beyond
projected levels, food production will continue to expand at about the
same rate as population growth. Prior to 1960 traditional export crops















Projected increase in the Level of Agricultural Production
Between 1960 —64 and 1970
(millions of 1964 soles)
443
0 yield 1 per cent yield2 per cent yield
Yield effect 185 561 1988
Acreage effect 1626 1626 1626
Total increase 1811 2187 3614
e
S
duction. We project a reversal of that situation for the period 1960—70.
It should be kept in mind however that the devaluation of 1967 has
resulted in a change of the cost-price relationships in the export sector.
Hence, beginning in 1968, pro4uction of exports will be larger than pre-
viously anticipated. This might raise the projected rate of growth in
export production for the period 1962—70 to 3.5 per cent.
It can be seen from Table 21 that the bulk of the increase in the value
of agricultural production will be forthcoming through land expansion
rather than through yield increases. Currently projected productivity
programs could permit an increase of 90 million soles beyond the mini-
mum expected increase of 185 million soles. But of the 162 million soles
required for these programs we expect only 50 million to be available.
Apart from the acceleration in productivity, it is expected that the
major part of the increase in agricultural production will be forthcoming





Projected Percentage Composition of the increase in Value of
Crop Production between 1960—64 and 1970
According to an Average of Yield Hypotheses 1 and 2
Coast Sierra Selva Republic
Food crops 38.6 25.8 11.0 75.5
Industrials 13.0 1.1 10.4 24.5
Total 51.6 26.9 21.4 .100.0
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is expected that the recent devaluation will accentuate the importance
of the coastal region as a contributor to agricultural growth, because of s
the anticipated acceleration in export production. r
PROJECTED INPUT REQUIREMENTS
In a systematic approach toward determining agricultural input require-
ments the classical factors of production, land, labor, and capital, as t
well as commercial inputs must be considered. In certain cases other a
physical factors impose narrower constraints, for example, water avail-
ability on the Coast and transportation facilities in the Selva. In the
I
Peruviancase there is a substantial elasticity in the availability of land,
labor, and capital (including those of manufactured origin). :
It is only in the last two years that a systematic attempt has been made
to study the effect of commercial inputs upon yield levels under empiri- o
cal conditions. Data obtained for the southern Sierra indicate that a d
moderate application of a balanced fertilizer will, on the average, double
the current yield level for potatoes and cereals (see Table 23). The
distributions of response coefficients are characteristically skewed to the p
TABLE23 B
l
Characteristic Response Coefficientsa Obtained Under Empirical ti
Conditions with Uniform Levelsb of Fertilization in ii




Number of ArithmeticPer Hectare
Crop ObservationsModeMedian Average (kilos)
Potatoes 1038 1.50 1.43 2.18 4894
Corn 773 1.50 2.31 1.33 846
Wheat 151 1.50 1.73 798










Source: Data supplied by Corporacion Nacional de Fertilizantes.
aResponse coefficient is yieldper hectare obtained without ferti-
lizer divided by yield per hectare obtained with fertilizer.
bApplicationequals 50-30-50 for potatoes and 51-30-0 for cereals..4 ThePeruvian Experience 445
right, so that the average exceeds the median. The most frequent re-
sponse coefficient indicates that recommended fertilization increases cur-
rent yield levels by half. When the average-response coefficient was used,
• the benefit-cost ratio of the fertilizer application equalled 9.1 for potatoes
and 2 for cereals. However the typical, or most frequent, benefit-cost
• ratio was 4 for potatoes and 1.1 for cereals. It follows from the fore-
going data that, for a substantial number of producers, fertilization of
cereals offered no economic incentive, whereas the fertilization of po-
tatoes was generally profitable. To the extent that supervised credit is
an essential component of public productivity programs, the figures
indicate that a substantial number of producers will not be able to repay
their credit, even though on the average the program results in substan-
tial productivity increases. Traditionally, public agricultural credit has
been extended with a view to sound banking principles rather than to
the objective of increasing land productivity. A shift towards the latter
objective in credit availability is a prerequisite for the success of pro-
ductivity programs in food crop production.
Preliminary input-output relations for the principal crops were ob-
tained by the Agricultural Planning Office from comprehensive cost-of-
production studies by SIPA 52andthe Agricultural Development Bank.'3
Both studies specified typical costs of production according to yield
levels. For a given projected yield level the corresponding input struc-
ture was determined through graphical interpolation. This assumes that
in achieving a higher yield level producers will follow the established
cultivation practices corresponding to that level. The expansion path in
input use is therefore not necessarily optimal in the sense that the pro-
ducer minimizes his cost for a given output. An increase in yield is
• generally obtained through a number of qualitative changes, such as the
simultaneous introduction of improved seed and fertilization. Therefore
a producer effectively changes his production function while moving
towards higher yield levels. Such shifts in the production function can
•
- frequentlybe effected at very little money cost to the producer. There-
• fore it has been found rather consistently that the average cost of pro-
duction is declining with higher yield levels. Using the projected yields
by crops and by regions according to three general productivity hy-
potheses, we computed the required outlay in terms of fertilizer, pesti-
- cides,seed, equipment, and labor. From Table 21 we find that hypoth-
esis three gives a yield-increasing effect of 1,803 million soles over
• hypothesis one (3,614 minus 1,811). Comparing the input requirements
• 52 Paez,op. cit.
Higginsand Piedra, op. cit.
1?
- •--.--_.
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TABLE 24
Projected Annual Cumulative Growth Rates in Input Requirements,









Fertilizer 6.8 12.0 —1.4 .6 3.3 6.9
Pesticides 5.8 8.9 1.2 4.4 3.3 6.5
Seed 3.1 4.8 —2.8 —1.6 2.7 4.3
Equipment 3.5 3.7 —3.6 —3.6 1.0 1.1
Labor 3.8 3.8 —3.1 —3.1 1.1 1.1
for hypotheses one and three, we found that the above increase of 1,803
million soles could be obtained for an additional outlay of fertilizer,
pesticides, and seed totalling 357 million soles. The marginal benefit-
cost ratio to the producers would therefore equal 5.1. Table 24 presents
the projected annual growth rates in input requirements according to
supply hypotheses one and three. Since hypothesis one is likely to be
exceeded by a small margin only, the projected rate of growth in de-
mand for commercial inputs will not exceed 4 per cent annually. On the
other hand the growth rate in labor requirements equals only 1.1 per
cent annually. This figure corresponds exactly with the officially pro-




















WALTER P. FALCON, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Professor Van de Wetering's paper is a contribution to the literature on
agricultural planning. As recent surveys by Gittinger and Ojala have
indicated,1 there are few available source materials on how developing
1P. Gittinger, The Literature of Agricultural Planning, National Planning
Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1966, and E. M. Ojala, "The Program-r
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countries have actually formulated their plans for the large an4 difficult
agricultural sector. Therefore, this detailed and thorough presentation
of the Peruvian approach should be most helpful to practicing planners
and to teachers of planning.
There are two aspects of the paper in particular that elicit comment.
The first is Van de Wetering's explicit treatment of the relationship
between agricultural planning and the over-all macro framework. Indeed,
this entire volume, which stresses the broad interactions, is a refreshing
change from earlier "fundamentalist" literature. The second appealing
feature is his technique, which can be characterized as emphasizing con-
sistency, efficiency, and sensitivity.2 Van de Wetering's continued con-
cern with commodity and regional balances and with the sensitivity of
results to varying assumptions is highly commendable.
In spite of these considerable merits, several aspects of the paper left
me uneasy. One of the major difficulties, especially for readers who are
not intimately familiar with Peru, is in distinguishing "what was" from
• "what should have been." Quite clearly, Van de Wetering was an insider
in the process and hence his description of what took place is first-rate.
Rarely, however, does he take issue with the methodology that was used
or the conclusions that were reached. Thus itis impossible to tell
whether or not he personally agrees with all of the main themes in the
paper. (The strong equity-over-growth bias that runs throughout is a
good case in point.) My major comments and criticisms, therefore, may
be on issues which were outside the control of the planners (e.g., Van de
Wetenng) and perhaps of the entire agricultural ministry. Yet they
should have been addressed in the paper.
The most serious of these issues is the question of priorities. Specifi-
cally, the absence of any discussion on priorities is the main defect of
the paper.. The significant priorities involve not only intersectoral ques-
tions, e.g., agriculture versus manufacturing, but intrasectoral issues as
well, e.g., export crops versus domestic food crops. To a large extent
my comments will focus on these matters. To a lesser extent they will
• raise questions about agricultural policy which also received only sum-
mary treatment in the paper.
In terms of general approach, I believe it fair to characterize the
Peruvian formulation as highly autarkic. Self-sufficiency in food seems
to have dominated the entire planning effort to 1970, and the effects
ming of Agricultural Development," in H. M. Southworth and B. F. Johnston
(ed), Agricultural Develppment and Economic Growth, Ithaca, N.Y., 1967, pp.
548—586.
2SeeD. E. Bell, "Allocating Development Resources," in C. J. Friedrich and
S. E. Harris (ed.), Public Policy, IX, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, pp. 84—106.448 Transforming Traditional Agriculture
(
ofan increased agncultural growth on the expansion of exports appear
to have been minimized. This seems a bit curious, especially in light of
several of the author's own statements. Exports appear to have played
an important role, especially for the agricultural sector. Since, in addi- t
tion, export crops grew at more than 8 per cent annually prior to 1960,
and since fishmeal exports are currently less encouraging, it seems ques- r
tionablewhether the discrimination against export crops through export
taxes and through relative neglect in terms of planned inputs is the
correct strategy. In any event, it would have been useful if Van de (
Weteringhad discussed this rather crucial priority issue, because vir- b
tually all of the projections in his paper are dependent upon it. I
Asecond interesting feature of the Peruvian approach to agricultural rI
planning is its strong demand orientation. In this context, a comparison g
between Peruvian and (say) Indian and Pakistani planning could not p
be more striking. For in the latter countries, the planning has started
with inputs and the supply potential in agriculture, and has then related
this growth in agricultural output to various macrovariables such as p
GNP, exports, etc. In the Peruvian case, however, projections were t
begunwith the assumption of growths in regional income and population. le
• Through the extensive use of income elasticities, commodity projections n
were made on a regional basis. These estimates were then conceived of 3.
as being what was "required" from agriculture.
In principle, there need be little cause for concern or comment as to IT
whetheragricultural planning begins with demand or supply considera-
tions. That both are important and must be analyzed is obvious. In prac- RI
tice,however, there are several aspects of this particular demand formu- ti
lation that caused me concern. First, there are suggestions, often quite
• explicit, that not only should the country as a whole be self-sufficient for cc
the major commodities, but that each of the regions should be as well. re
Van de Wetering states, for example (page 420), that "in agricultural in
promotion programs consideration might well be given a reallocation of
resourcesdetermined by future deficits in (regional) domestic produc- ex
tion." Surely this is carrying the autarkic and regional-balance priority ty
too far. Surely the possibility of solving imbalances by fiscal rather than
production means ought to have been discussed more fully. (One might
even argue that one of the principal objectives of agricultural planning in
• Peru ought to be increased economic integration of the regions.) Prob-
ably it is this demand orientation and methodology that explain why the ou
• principal attention, as noted, above, is on food crops rather than on ex-
• port commodities. Second, it is obviously difficult in this formulation to pel
estimate the growth in per capita incomes, especially for the more rural poi
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areas, until there is some estimate of the growth of agricultural output.
This reconciliation never comes about, at least not explicitly, within the
paper. Third, the what-is-required-from-agriculture approach may have
been a contributing factor in leading the Peruvian planners to focus on
"feasibility" rather than "optimality" for agriculture,i.e.,"...the
preliminary agricultural development plan should limit itself to deter-
mining in a systematic manner the feasible rate of growth, rather than
the optimal rate of growth or optimal allocation of public expenditure"
(page 394). This is not to say that supply considerations do not enter,
but they are brought in at a very late stage and then only in deciding
whether the various regional demands can be met. And nowhere in any
real sense are there discussions of farmer acceptance of various pro-
grams, of increasing innovation in rural areas, and of other general
problems of production within a decentralized decision-making frame-
work.
A third feature of the Peruvian plan is the size and structure of the
public program for agriculture. By international standards the 3 per cent
total spent on agriculture is very low.3 Indeed, to have struggled with the
lengthy discussion of the macromodel only to find that the maximum
range of public expenditure to be considered for agriculture was 2.8—
3.3 per cent was a little like finding the baby gone with the bathwater.
In short, this narrow range eliminated at the outset a number of the
more interesting comparisons. It would have been most interesting, for
example, to have known what a 5ora 10 per cent allocation might have
for agriculture and what effect this would have had in turn on
the more macrovariables.
Given this 3 per cent total, and given the sizeable proportion of funds
committed for land-expanding activities, the author is undoubtedly cor-
rect in stating that "public expenditure is too small to have a notable
impact on productivity improvement." His discussion highlights the
problems, not only of a small total, but also of a governmental bias for
extensive rather than intensive approach. In this regard, Peru seems
typical of many of the developing countries.
Even with the limited financing for yield-increasing programs, how-
ever, I would have liked to know more about how the various pro-
ductivity programs (especially research and promotion service) were
assessed and how each was expected to contribute towards the increased
output shown in Table 11. In particular, additional information on the
3InPakistan, for exaniiple, approximately 15 per cent of the development ex-
penditure goes to agriculture directly. If "irrigation" also is included the pro-


















choice of the "input package" would have been interesting for com-
parative purposes. The recent literature which has stressed physical
complementarity among agricultural inputs has argued an important
principle. But what a country or an agricultural ministry does in "pack-
age selection" when faced with financial, administrative, and organiza-
tional shortages seems to me to be the crux of the agricultural planning
function.4 On this point the discussion is brief, although Van de Weter-
ing's major point, viz., that the proposed agricultural program, regardless
of how allocated, is much too small to alter significantly the future pat-
4
ternof agricultural productions, comes through clearly.
Finally, the paper as presently cast is primarily concerned with the
setting of targets. Unquestionably this is an important aspect of plan-
ning. But planning ought, in my opinion, primarily to be a framework
for policy making. And on the important policy questions Van de
Wetering says relatively little. How, for example, is the switch from
export to food crops to be accelerated? Through price incentives? Input
• subsidies? Tax policy? To ask for further discussion and analysis of
these policy questions after the lengthy and detailed material already
presented by Van de Wetering may be unkind; yet I am sure he would
agree that the policy aspects of a plan are far more important for its
success than is the setting of targets.
Notwithstanding the above comments, this paper does add signifi-
cantly to one aspect of the literature on planning. In large part, the com-
ments that I have put forth simply ask for additional analyses or take
as variables' certain parameters that Van de Wetering, as an insider,
may have found as fixed.
For further discussion on this point see J. W. Mellor, "Production Problems
• and Issues in Agricultural Development," Journal of Farm Economics, December
1966, pp. 1195—1202, and this writer's comments thereon, pp. 1207—1209.
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